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Harder, Jeremey M., M.A., May 1997 Political Science
The Future of European Security; Expanded Membership and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization’s Search for a Role in the Post-Cold War Period.
Director: Prof. Forest Grieves ^
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent disintegration of the 
Warsaw Pact ushered in a new era in European security. The stable bipolar 
confrontation that existed for forty years between the Soviet Union and the 
United States ended almost overnight. The end result has been the creation of 
an unstable multipolar Europe. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the Warsaw Pact, debate began regarding the relevance of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) in the post-Gold War Europe. Initial statements by 
NATO member nations reaffirmed their desire to maintain the alliance and 
possibly expand the alliance into Central and Eastern Europe.
Although expansion of the alliance seems a foregone conclusion, and while 
there may be persuasive support for the expansion, this study argues that there 
are also important reasons either for not increasing the membership or for at 
least understanding some of the more important problems associated with an 
expanded membership. Though a number of issues -  on both sides — surround 
the expansion of the alliance, this study examines the most prominent among 
them. The arguments supporting an expanded NATO include: the possibility of 
new missions for the alliance, dealing with the new Russia, and the basis for a 
broader security framework. The problems surrounding an expanded NATO 
include: antagonizing Russia, the problem of consensus, the possibility of an 
economic drain on Western resources, and the problem of exclusion.
Following the analysis of the arguments supporting expansion and the 
problems relating to it, the final chapter discusses where the alliance currently 
stands in its search for a role, and concludes that an expanded membership 
does not address the issue of what the alliance’s new role is to be in the post 
Cold-War period. An expanded membership only creates a larger alliance that 
still lacks long term vision.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Plan of Study
Following the defeat of Nazi Germany, a new power began to emerge as the 
dominant military threat to Western Europe. This new threat came in the form of 
a war-time ally, the Soviet Union. During the war, the victorious armies of the 
Soviet Union had marched across Eastern and Central Europe. The presence of 
these armies and the establishment of "popular” governments compelled the 
countries of Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Albania, and 
Czechoslovakia to fall within the Soviet Union's sphere of influence.
Faced with the possibility of continued Soviet expansion, the nations of 
Western Europe turned to the United States in an attempt to secure their 
freedom and security. In response, President Harry Truman put before 
Congress a policy of United States' support to nations attempting to resist 
Communist expansion. This policy became known as the Truman Doctrine. In 
addition to the Truman Doctrine, the United States also initiated the Marshall 
Plan, an economic program aimed at rebuilding the nations of Europe. Despite 
these efforts by the United States, the nations of Western Europe still felt 
threatened by the Soviet Union.
On March 4, 1948, representatives from the United Kingdom, France, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg met in Brussels to consider a treaty of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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mutual assistance. Their efforts resulted in the Brussels Treaty. This treaty 
was essentially a pledge by the signatories to come to the aid of one another in 
the event of armed aggression. In addition, the signatories also pledged to "build
up a common defense system and to strengthen their economic and cultural
2
ties." At the onset of the Berlin Blockade — June 1948 — it became clear that 
the United States would have to play a greater role in European security. Thus 
the United States would be brought out of "an isolated Fortress America," and
3
once again become entangled in European affairs.
Preliminary talks about safeguarding Western Europe from Soviet expansion 
opened on July 6, 1948, in Washington D.C. The negotiations centered on the 
inclusion of Canada and the United States into some form of collective EuropearT 
security agreement. The basis for the creation of a security arrangement of this 
type was Chapter VII, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the right of 
individual or collective self-defense. The conference culminated in the signing of 
the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949. The treaty established an alliance for 
the collective defense of Western Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). In time the treaty would incorporate a total of sixteen nations: Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
 ̂ NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and 
Press, 1969), p 234.
 ̂ Ibid., 20.
3
Thomas A. Bailey, The Art of Diolomacv: The American Experience (New 
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), 287.
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Netherlands, Norway. Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States.
During its over forty-year history, NATO has stood against the Soviet Union 
and the Warsaw Pact — Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union’s counterpart to 
NATO. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of 
the Warsaw Pact, NATO is now confronting the Post-Cold War world. This study 
examines the thesis that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has fulfilled its 
original mission, that of a defensive alliance, based on Inis Claude’s idea of 
selective security, with the intent of curbing possible Soviet expansion and is now
4
searching for a new role. Whatever role emerges will likely involve a re­
definition of the identity of the alliance as it confronts an expanded membership . 
from the former Warsaw Pact states. While the pending expansion of NATO 
membership seems a foregone conclusion and while there may be persuasive 
support for the expansion, this study argues that there are also important 
reasons either for not increasing the membership or for at least understanding 
some of the more important problems associated with an expanded 
membership.
Since there no longer appears to be a direct threat to the security of Western 
Europe, NATO's expanded membership seems to be an important step in 
addressing its new role. The purpose of this study is to examine the current
4
Inis L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of 
International Organization (New York: Random House, 1971), 266
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literature and discussions concerning the entry of Eastern European states and 
former Soviet republics into the alliance and attempt to delineate the major 
arguments both for and against an expanded NATO. To accomplish this task, 
this study examines the perceived benefits and a number of possible problems 
relating to the expansion the alliance.
A potential benefit of extending NATO membership to Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet republics is that this action could help to bring security and
stability to the whole of Europe. According to Henry A. Kissinger, the integration
of Central and Eastern Europe into the European Union — though not covered in
detail here -  and NATO would provide greater security and stability to these
emerging nations and the whole of Europe. Dr. Kissinger writes:
Both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union are 
indispensable building blocks of a new and stable world order.
NATO is the best protection against military blackmail from any 
quarter: the European Union is an essential mechanism for 
stability in Central and Eastern Europe. Both institutions are 
needed to relate the former satellites and successor states of the
5
Soviet Union to a peaceful international order.
By integrating the former satellite and successor states of the Soviet Union into 
the alliance, NATO could provide security to the whole of Europe and could be 
better prepared to deal with future threats to European security (e.g., from a 
resurgent, nationalistic Russia). Additionally, the integration of these countries 
into NATO would create "an entirely new all-European security system," that
 ̂Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 823.
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5
could end the division of Europe "in a way that would preserve those aspects of
current collective security arrangements that remain useful."^
Despite the perceived benefits from expanding the North Atlantic Alliance, a 
number of problems also appear. Most prominent among the potential problems 
would be a continuing inability of NATO to clarify its role. In spite of the 
optimistic view of Henry Kissinger, membership expansion does not 
automatically resolve important questions concerning the security role of the 
alliance. A further problem concerns NATO’s organizational framework, in 
particular, its political mechanisms and military structure. According to Jane 
Perlez, a reporter for the New York Times International, the Western and 
Eastern models of military leadership are fundamentally different; "In the old 
Warsaw Pact everything was fed from the top down. In the West, a company
commander can make a decision; it's decision-making as low as you can 
Other problems relating to an expanded membership include the following: a 
possible economic drain on Western resources by bringing Eastern Europe into 
the fold; more members increases the difficulty in reaching a consensus: and a 
larger NATO could conflict with other pan-European organizations lending 
assistance to Eastern Europe.
Malcolm Chalmers, "Beyond the Alliance System: The case for a European 
Security Organization” World Policy Journal 7 (Spring 1990): 225-226.
 ̂Jane Perlez, "For Hungarian Army Officers, It's 'Eyes West!' " New York 
Times International 2 (January 1997), p. A-3.
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The problems facing NATO following the collapse of the Soviet Union and ^ 
the Warsaw Pact are somewhat symptomatic of the organization’s theoretical 
foundations. The Atlantic Alliance was created to prevent the expansion of a 
single foe, the Soviet Union. With the disappearance of that enemy, the 
organization now faces a serious identity crisis. In order to understand the 
problems facing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, there must first be an 
understanding of the theoretical basis of the alliance, an understanding of both 
the ideal security arrangement, collective security, and the most practical 
arrangement to date, selective security.
Theoretical Basis
Collective Security 
The First World War is often associated with the failure of the balance of 
power system of international politics. The balance of power is a key concept
among realists, referring to a condition of equilibrium that can exist among
8
nation-states. Generally, under the balance of power system, nations or groups 
of nations join together in an effort to off-set the power of another nation or group 
of nations. In essence, their actions seek to maintain the status quo. Balance of 
power theorists often differ on whether the system is created by the nations’ 
political leaders or whether the system is an inherent characteristic of
8
Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism. 
Pluralism. Globalism (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), 575.
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international politics. Whatever the case, the balance of power system is often 
associated with the outbreak of the First World War.
Following the First World War, the victors attempted to establish a new world
order for the maintenance of international peace, a system designed to replace
the balance of power. The new system that was envisioned was called collective
security. Following the First World War, the League of Nations provided the
institutional framework for collective security. This system was designed to
prevent aggression through the threat of combined action on the part of the
community of nations. According to Inis Claude, a prominent scholar in the field
of international organizations, the designers envisioned a system which;
...involved the establishment and operation of a complex scheme of 
national commitments and international mechanisms designed to 
prevent or suppress aggression by any state against any other 
state, by presenting to potential aggressors the credible threat and 
to potential victims of aggression the reliable promise of effective 
collective measures, ranging from diplomatic boycott through ^
economic pressure to military sanctions, to enforce the peace.
The idea of collective security was put forth as a new method of maintaining the 
peace among the nations of the world. The designers argued that collective 
security was better at preserving the peace than the balance of power, and the 
competing alliances that were a product of it. Despite the optimism of the 
original architects of collective security, the system itself did not function as 
planned, and over time has lost some of its meaning. According to Inis Claude, 
if a system of collective security is to be effective it must satisfy a number of
9
Inis Claude, Swords into Plowshares. 247.
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Q
subjective requirements, “related to the general acceptability of the 
responsibilities,” and objective requirements, “related to the suitability of the
global situation to the operation of collective security.” °
For a collective security system to work there must be commitment by the 
members to uphold international peace. The system requires that “the premise 
of the ‘indivisibility of peace’ should be deeply established in the thinking of 
governments and p eo p le sE sse n t ia l ly ,  the system requires that all of the 
nations have an interest in maintaining world peace. Another requirement is that 
the interests of the world community and the maintenance of world peace must 
out-weigh national level interests. Related to this requirement is the notion that 
the right of self-defense must be restrained and that national foreign policy and - 
defense policy can be over-ridden.
In addition to the subjective requirements, collective security also depends on 
a number of objective requirements. For a collective security system to function 
properly a legal organizational framework, or structure must be established. 
Essentially, the global power system must be considerably diffused. The nation­
states themselves must be roughly equal in strength, and the world must be 
considerably disarmed. The collective security organization also needs to have a 
universality of membership and large-scale economic interdependence. To 
summarize.
Ibid.. 250. 
"  Ibid.
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...collective security assumes the existence of a world in which 
every state is so limited by the distribution of power, the reduction 
of military power levels by a disarmament program, and the lack of 
economic self-sufficiency, that any state which may develop 
aggressive inclinations can be held in check by methods which
probably need not include the large-scale use of force.
When considered as a whole, these requirements add up to the “fundamental 
subjective requirement that all states be willing to entrust their destinies to 
collective security. Confidence is the quintessential condition of the success of 
the system; states must be prepared to rely upon its effectiveness and
13
impartiality.” The reliance on nation-states to accept these preconditions leads 
to a serious dilemma, the problem of circularity.
Collective security will only work if nations follow certain guidelines, but 
nations will only participate if collective security works. Collective security calls
14
for the “moral transformation of political man.” The number and wide range of 
requirements for the successful implementation of a collective security system 
have forced nations to consider other options for maintaining the peace.
The failure of the League of Nations to prevent the outbreak of the Second 
World War resulted in the creation of the United Nations. The basis of the UN’s 
security arrangement is collective security. However, despite the new 
organizational structure, the UN’s security apparatus is still plagued by the same
Ibid., 260 
Ibid., 255. 
Ibid., 256.
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10theoretical problems as that of Its predecessor. As a result, nations have 
largely become dependent upon regional security arrangements. Arrangements 
that utilize a system of selective security instead of a system of collective 
security.
Selective Securitv
The United Nation’s management of its peacekeeping operations and its 
handling of various regional conflicts have prompted nations to look for other 
methods with which to safeguard their interests. These nations have 
subsequently created regional security arrangements based on Articles 51 
through 54 of the United Nations Charter — the right of nations to create regional 
organizations for collective self-defense and the regional resolution of disputes. 
When the Western powers decided to form the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization it was these articles, primarily Article 51, that justified that decision. 
The decision to form a regional security organization, was because of a 
perceived structural problem with the whole idea of collective security. A 
prominent scholar in the area of conflict prevention outlines the problem as 
follows:
...as long as the primary political units of world society are nation­
states, determined to protect their independence above all other 
values except physical survival and run by leadership groups 
accountable to domestic interests ahead of world interests, no 
member nation of an international collective security association 
will participate in actions likely to put its independence and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
domestic interests at risk unless such participation is clearly 
required to protect these interests/^
11
Based on this perceived problem with the collective security system, NATO was 
created. Inis Claude argues that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization does not 
“purport to be an arrangement whereby a community proposes to put down any 
aggressor that might arise within its ranks; rather it is a design for joint resistance
to possible aggression stemming from a particular power bloc external to the
16
community.” The smaller, more directed nature of the organization forms the 
basis for a system of selective security.
A system of selective security is one in which the enemy has been clearly 
defined, and the members are simply waiting for that enemy to act. Instead of 
waiting for any nation to attack any other, with the entire community then taking 
action, selective security is primarily concerned with the defense of its members 
in relation to the defined enemy. According to Claude, selective security is a 
policy of “some for some, whereas collective security is dedicated to the concept
of all for all."^^ With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the 
clearly defined enemy has disappeared, leaving the Atlantic Alliance in a unique 
situation. The disappearance of NATO’s enemy has left many questioning the 
relevance of the alliance. Some would argue that there are other European
15
Seyom Brown, The Causes and Prevention of War (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1994), 185.
Claude, Swords into Plowshares. 266.
Ibid.
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security arrangements, such as the Western European Union and the 
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, that are better suited to 
dealing with the post Cold-War world than NATO.
Other European Security Arrangements
Western European Union
The Western European Union (WEU) was set up by the treaty of Economic,
Social, and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-defense which was signed
in Paris on October 23, 1954. The agreement that was signed in Paris was a
modification of the original Brussels Treaty and allowed Italy and West Germany
to join the new organization. The text of the agreement is similar to that of the
Brussels Treaty in that it calls for its members to cooperate closely in economic,
social, and cultural fields. Additionally, the Paris agreement calls on members to
create a firm basis for European economic recovery, offer assistance to each
other in the event of armed aggression, preserve the principles of democracy,
18
and encourage the progressive integration of Europe. Subsequent provisions 
established the levels of men and materials to be present among the signatories. 
The machinery of the WEU is straightforward, consisting of five different 
branches: a council, a secretariat, the Standing Armaments Committee, the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments, and a consultative assembly.
David M. Wood and Birol A. Yesilada, The Emerging European Union 
(White Plains, New York: Longman Publishers, 1996), 224.
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From its creation in 1955 to 1984, the WEU was not a major player in 
European politics, accomplishing only two major political achievements. First, 
the WEU helped to facilitate the integration of West Germany into NATO, and 
second, the organization served as a link between the European Union (EU) and 
the United Kingdom, until the latter became a member of the EU.^^ Until 1984, 
the WEU was largely inactive in the European Union’s foreign policy making 
processes until the French government sought to reactivate and revitalize the 
organization.
Unhappy with United States’ strategic defense and nuclear policies, France
began a campaign to reactivate the dormant organization in October, 1984. As a
result of this displeasure, a series of meetings were held in Rome by the foreign .
and defense ministers of the WEU’s member countries, whereupon they agreed
to reactivate and strengthen the organization. The meetings culminated in the
signing of the Rome Declaration. The Rome Declaration reaffirmed previous
intentions and outlined new goals for the organization, which included;
...the WEU’s commitment to strengthen peace and security, to 
promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of 
Europe, to cooperate more closely both among member states and 
with other European organizations, to make better use of the WEU 
framework in order to increase cooperation between the members 
in the field of security and to encourage consensus, and to improve 
the common defense of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance
since the two institutions were both designed to provide security to
20
the West.
'®lbid., 225. 
Ibid.
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In the three years following the Rome Declaration, a number of important 
developments took place which allowed the organization to be additionally 
strengthened.
The first of these events was the call by the Single European Act to Increase 
collaboration in political and security matters, and the WEU served as the logical 
forum where discussion could take place. The second reason for the WEU’s 
increase In strength was the addition of Portugal and Spain to the organization. 
The final reason for the WEU’s increase in power was the Hague Platform, 
adopted in October of 1987. The Hague Platform emphasized the role of the 
WEU in consolidating the European side of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, and members called for closer military and diplomatic cooperation 
in the resolution of out-of-area crisis. During the late 1980s another round of 
debates began concerning the WEU’s future.
The debates centered on two different proposals from member nations. The 
first proposal was put forward by the German and French governments. Their 
proposal called for the creation of joint armed forces to serve as the nucleus of 
an independent defense force. The second proposal was put forward by the 
governments of Britain and Italy. This proposal called for the members to form a 
Rapid Reaction Force, which would be used to defend interests outside of 
NATO’s sphere of influence. The debates resulted in a common view put 
forward in the Maastrict Treaty that outlined the role of WEU in relation to other 
European organizations and addressed issues surrounding the expansion of the 
WEU. With regards to interactions with other European organizations, the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Maastrict Treaty encouraged WEU members to cooperate closely and form a  ̂̂  
European defense policy. These measures were intended to enhance the 
European side of NATO, providing a more cohesive unit rather than a separate 
one. Regarding the admittance of new members, the Maastrict Treaty 
encouraged other EU members to join and European member states of NATO to 
become associate members of the WEU.
In light of the end of the Cold War, the WEU is forced once again to re­
evaluate its position and its mission. Despite efforts to create a common 
European defense policy, the WEU has been unsuccessful. The lack of success 
on the part of the WEU to create defense policy is best illustrated by the crisis in 
the former Yugoslavia. The war in the former Yugoslavia shows that the
organization was ill-prepared for action, and serves to highlight the problems
21
among the member nations in coordinating their national foreign policies. 
Additionally, disagreements over policy toward the region strained the relations 
between WEU members and other regional security organizations. As the war 
progressed, it became clear that the WEU lacked the necessary military structure 
to intervene in the region, forcing the United Nations to turn to NATO to carry on 
with the peacekeeping operation. According to Jeffrey Simon, a senior fellow at 
the Institute for National Strategic Studies, the WEU is simply “not credible for
Ibid., 229.
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many European security challenges, not only does the WEU lack political will, it 
needs US military assets to be effective.
Council for Securitv and Cooperation in Europe 
The Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe convened in 1972. The 
conference itself was an attempt by Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to 
create an all-European security organization. Despite the appeal of an all- 
European security organization, the Western powers correctly perceived the 
initiative as an attempt to isolate the United States from Western Europe. That 
the Soviet Union was “committed to excluding the United States is evidence of 
the primary Eastern objective of isolating Western Europe from the United States 
in security discussions,” in the view of two scholars specializing in European
23
defense policies, Catherine M. Kelleher and Gale A. Mattox. When the 
conference began, both East and West took the opportunity to move ahead with 
their own agendas.
Eastern Europe’s agenda was very ambitious and contained a number of 
different goals. First, the East wanted to gain recognition for the borders that 
had evolved since the end of World War Two, especially “the western borders of
24
Poland and the borders of the German Democratic Republic.” In addition to
Jeffrey Simon, "Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO" Orbis 37 (Winter 
1993): 27.
Catherine M. Kelleher and Gale A. Mattox, Evolving European Defense 
Policies (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), 131.
Ibid.
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recognizing the borders, the East wanted to gain the format recognition by the 
West of the German Democratic Republic. Eastern Europe was also interested 
in trying to undermine the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in the view of 
Kelleher and Mattox, by “establishing a permanent process for discussions of 
European security issues that would transcend both Western and Eastern
25
alliance pacts." The Western approach to the conference was very different 
than that of their Eastern neighbors. The West used the conference to lay the 
groundwork for reducing the amount of conventional forces in Europe through 
the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks.
The conference culminated in an announcement by the participants that 
agreements had been reached and a summit-level meeting was scheduled in 
Helsinki. From the Helsinki summit, three important provisions were agreed 
upon (Baskets I, II, and III) the third being the most important. Baskets I and II 
focused on political and economic issues, respectively. Basket III focused on the 
issue of human rights, obliging all signatories to “practice and foster certain
enumerated basic human r ig h ts .A cco rd ing  to Henry Kissinger, Basket III 
played an important role in the disintegration of the Soviet satellite orbit, serving 
as a “rallying point in their [Eastern European reformers] fights to free their 
countries from Soviet d om ina t ion .D u r ing  the revolutions in Eastern Europe,
Ibid.
Kissinger, Diplomacy. 759. 
Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1Athe leaders used the provisions in Basket III to help topple Soviet control of 
their countries. Following the end of Cold War, the Council for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe has been transformed into the Organization of Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
The OSCE is “a multi-leveled process of consultation, supervision, and 
'consensual action’ taken in response to violations of its principles and norms,” 
according to Michael R. Lucas, a Senior Research Fellow of the World Policy
Institute at the New School for Social Research in New York.^^ Additionally,
Lucas writes, the organization requires its members to “manage their armed 
forces and defense policies according to OSCE principles pertaining to the
29
human dimension, international law, security, and confidence building.” The 
basic purpose of the organization is to provide a forum for conflict prevention, 
early warning regarding the outbreak of possible conflicts, and early action in 
dealing with those conflicts. Currently the OSCE provides a political forum for 
discussions regarding European security; however, without a standing military 
structure of some kind, the organization can do little in Europe physically to 
prevent the outbreak of a conflict, or contain a conflict once started.
Michael R. Lucas, “The OSCE Code of Conduct and Its Relevance in 
Contemporary Europe” Aussenpolitik 47 (3rd Quarter 1996): 227.
20
Ibid., 223.
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Summary
The failure of the Western European Union and the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe to prevent or control the fighting in the former 
Yugoslavia illustrates the need for an organization that can do more than simply 
arrange meetings and talk. Neither the OSCE nor the WEU have a standing 
military: instead, Lucas asserts, each serves as a “structure of soft security,’”
and “cannot replace organizations of hard security’ such as NATO Both of 
these organizations have the potential to play a major role in shaping European 
defense policy in the future; however, both organizations currently suffer from 
serious flaws. The lack of a defined command structure and military assets in 
both the WEU and the OSCE are the main reasons that neither one represents a 
suitable replacement for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Therefore, to maintain peace and security in Europe, NATO is again left to 
shoulder the burden. NATO becomes the focus of peace and security for two 
reasons -  first because of its record as the most successful European security 
arrangement, and second because of its clearly defined military apparatus. The 
question then becomes, without a specific enemy, how will NATO deal with the 
post Cold War world? One answer to this question is found in the expansion of 
NATO’s membership to include the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, as 
well as those states of the former Soviet Union. Although expansion of the 
alliance is already underway, and has the potential to be extremely beneficial to
Ibid.
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European security, as chapter three will explain, a number of issues regarding 
the expansion must still be considered. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to 
examine the history of the Atlantic Alliance, and the possible benefits and 
problems associated with an expanded membership.
Chapter two of the thesis contains three sections which examine the history 
and background of the Atlantic Alliance. The first section details the creation of 
the alliance. The second section focuses on the organizational structure, and 
the last section looks at the history of the alliance. The third chapter also 
contains three sections, focusing on the arguments supporting an expanded 
membership. The first section examines some of the possible new missions that 
the alliance would encounter should it expand. The second section examines 
the role that an expanded NATO could play in relation to the new Russia. The 
final section discusses the possibility that membership expansion could form the 
basis of a broader security framework.
The fourth chapter contains four parts, detailing some of the problems 
surrounding the expansion of NATO membership. The first section examines 
the possible fall-out that could take place between the West and Russia. The 
next section investigates the economic drain that could befall the West if 
membership is extended to these newly independent countries. The third 
section looks at the problems that greater membership would have on the 
alliance’s ability to reach a consensus. The final section examines the 
relationship between NATO and the countries that do not gain admittance to the
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21organization. The final chapter reviews the material discussed and also 
attempts to identify where the alliance currently stands in its search for a new 
role.
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY NATO
Creation
Europe After World War II 
Following the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union emerged as 
the dominant continental military power. During the war the Soviet army had 
marched victoriously across the countries of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, 
Rumania, Hungary, Albania, and into Eastern Germany. The presence of these 
armies and the establishment of pro-Soviet governments effectively compelled 
the countries of Eastern and Central Europe to fall within the Soviet Union's 
sphere of influence and prompted new fears of possible Soviet aggression 
directed at the war-weary nations of Western Europe. It was during this time of 
uncertainty about Soviet motives that Winston Churchill delivered his famous 
speech at Fulton, Missouri, declaring that "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in
the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent."
The countries of Greece and Turkey became the first areas of contention 
between the Soviet Union and the United States. In February 1947, Great
Thomas G. Patterson, J. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan, American 
Foreion Relations: A History Since 1895 (Lexington, Mass.; D C. Heath and 
Company, 1995), 282.
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Britain notified the United States that their government could no longer afford to^^ 
protect Greece and Turkey. The United States was left to shoulder the burden of 
protecting the balance of power in Europe and the Mediterranean. In his book, 
Crusaders and Pragmatists: Movers of Modern Foreign Policy. John Stoessinger 
asserts that allowing the Soviet Union access into Greece and Turkey would 
prove detrimental to Western security. Stoessinger writes, "Communist
penetration of Greece and Turkey would give the Soviet Union a strong base in
2
the eastern Mediterranean that would further threaten American interests." The 
problems in Greece centered around a civil war. The pro-Western, Athenian 
government was under attack by leftist rebels, the ELAS (National Popular 
Liberation Army) and its political arm, the EAM (National Liberation Front). In 
Turkey, the point of contention was the Dardanelles — the straits separating Asia 
Minor from Europe. These straits connect the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea.
The Soviet Union had threatened to take action against the Turks if they refused 
the Soviet offer of joint control of the straits. In American eyes the Russians 
were trying to topple the Greek government and subjugate Turkey, bringing 
these countries into their own sphere of influence.
In response to the events in Greece and Turkey, President Harry S. Truman 
called a special joint session of Congress. During the session Truman spoke of 
the threat that the Soviet Union posed to world peace. In this speech to
2
John G. Stoessinger, Crusaders and Pragmatists: Movers of Modern 
American Foreign Policy (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1985), 61.
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Congress he proclaimed his “doctrine” as "the policy of the United States to 
support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed
3
minorities or by outside pressures." To ensure this policy's success, Truman 
asked Congress for $400 million to counter the Soviet threat to Turkey and 
combat leftist rebels in Greece According to J. A. S. Grenville, the aid to Greece 
was placed in the context of "combating the designs of a communist assault on
4
the free world." The long term effects of the Truman Doctrine were to ensure
that Greece and Turkey were kept out of Soviet hands and subsequently brought
into the American sphere of influence.
During the late 1940s, under the standard of containing Soviet expansion, the
US goals for Western Europe had taken form. Thomas Patterson contends that
the goals of the United States included:
...economic reconstruction and hunger relief, linkage of Germany's 
western zones with Western European economic system, 
reinvigorated trade with the United States, prevention of leftist 
political gains, ouster of communists from governments (especially 
in Italy and France), settlement of colonial disputes (as in Indo­
china and Indonesia) that were draining funds, blockage of
neutralist tendencies, and building military allies.
 ̂Cited in Henry A. Kissinger, Diolomacv (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1994), 453.
J.A.S. Grenville, A History of the World in the Twentieth Century 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1994), 382.
 ̂Patterson et al.. American Foreign Relations. 292.
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By 1947, the United States had already spent over $9 billion in Western Europe 
in an attempt to rebuild the damage from the war. However, the reconstruction 
of Europe proceeded slowly.
In 1945, the prediction in the United States had been that rebuilding Europe 
would be strictly short-term; as the expenditures of 1947 proved, the predictions 
were incorrect. The Truman administration recognized that the speedy recovery 
of Western Europe required further American aid. The exports from Europe 
were unable to pay for the imports from America that were needed by Europeans 
in order to rebuild their countries' infrastructures. In an effort to solve this 
problem. Secretary of State George Marshall introduced a plan aimed at helping 
the countries of Europe rebuild.
The plan became known as the Marshall Plan. It was designed to 
reinvigorate the domestic economies of Western Europe and to prevent the
spread of communism. The aim of the Marshall Plan, Stoessinger claims, was
6
"the ultimate restoration of the economies of Europe through American aid." 
Participation in the US aid program was open to any nation, including the Soviet 
Union and those countries within its sphere of influence. Despite interest in the 
plan by Eastern European nations, the Soviet Union refused to allow them to 
participate.
In September 1947, sixteen European nations met to discuss the details of 
the Marshall Plan. At the conference, the delegates agreed on the outline of a
 ̂Stoessinger, Crusaders and Pragmatists. 61.
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four-year European recovery program leading to the creation of the 
Organization for European Economic Co-operation (GEEC). This organization 
had the responsibility of creating the individual recovery programs for each 
country. From the American perspective the Marshall Plan was a success; it 
served to reinvigorate the economies of Western Europe, strengthened the ties 
between Europe and the United States, and provided a much needed boost in 
the American economy.
The next year tensions between East-West had become increasingly 
strained. In February 1948, the coalition government of Czechoslovakia had 
been ousted by a Communist coup. The impact on Western governments was 
severe, prompting new fears of Soviet aggression or Communist coups 
supported by their military. In March of the same year -  in response to the 
Prague coup -  representatives from Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom met in Brussels to consider a treaty of
mutual assistance. Their efforts resulted in the signing of the Brussels Treaty.^ 
This treaty was essentially a pledge by the signatories to come to the aid of one 
another in the event of armed aggression. In addition, the signatories also
pledged to "build up a common defense system and to strengthen their
8
economic and cultural ties."
 ̂NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and 
Press, 1969). 234.
® Ibid., 20.
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OTDespite the pledge of these countries to come to the aid of one another, 
they were simply not well equipped to deal with the Soviet Union should it decide 
to attack west. Every analysis of the relative power positions, according to Henry 
Kissinger, "indicated that Western Europe simply did not have sufficient strength
to repel a Soviet attack."^ Following the signing of this treaty, the Soviet Union 
withdrew from the Allied Control Council and began to interfere with the Western 
Allies’ attempts to communicate with the Western half of Berlin. In time the 
Soviet Union became increasingly belligerent, culminating in a general blockade 
of Berlin in June, 1948. It was the Soviet Union's hope that the blockade of 
Berlin would force the allies to give up their policies regarding Germany. Instead 
of forcing the allies to rethink their policies, the Berlin Blockade hastened the 
process of creating an Atlantic defense pact.
In April, 1948, the idea of creating a single mutual defense system covering 
Western Europe and North America, designed to supersede the Brussels Treaty, 
was put forward in the Canadian House of Commons. One week later, Senator 
Vandenburg, a Republican from Michigan, introduced the Vandenburg 
Resolution in the US Congress, which recommended that the United States 
should participate in the creation of a defense pact with Western Europe, based
on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. ° Article 51, which provided the 
basis of the alliance, states;
 ̂Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 457. 
NATO Facts and Figures. 237.
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Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council 
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right 
of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security 
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to 
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.
Preliminary talks between Canada, the United States and the signatories of 
the Brussels Treaty opened in Washington D C, on July 6, 1948, and ended on 
September 9, with a report to the respective governments. In October the 
Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty was able to announce "the complete
identity of views on the principle of a defensive pact for the North Atlantic area."^^ 
In March of the following year the text of the North Atlantic Treaty was made 
public; additionally, the countries of Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Nonway, and 
Portugal were invited to accede to the Treaty. Despite Soviet objections, the 
North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949, in Washington D C., creating 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 1952, Greece and Turkey 
joined the alliance, three years after that the Federal Republic of Germany 
officially became a member, and in 1982 Spain acceded to the treaty.
Organization
The framework of NATO provides an excellent example of what the 
organizational structure of a security alliance should resemble. As NATO is likely
Ibid., 21
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to continue to exist, it is important to have an understanding of the machinery -  
military structure, the North Atlantic Council, the Secretary General, and the 
various committees — of the alliance.
North Atlantic Treatv
The North Atlantic Treaty is essentially a framework for wide co-operation 
among the signatories, providing joint action in the military, political, economic, 
and social fields. The signatory countries undertake, in conformity with the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to preserve peace and 
international security and to promote stability and well-being in their respective 
areas. In addition, the signatories also endeavor to eliminate incompatibilities in 
their economic policies and to encourage economic co-operation among 
themselves. In essence, the treaty has a dual nature. On the one hand it 
reaffirms a security policy based on the inherent right to collective self-defense -  
as stated in the Charter of the United Nations — while on other hand it proclaims 
the importance of economic and social progress within the alliance and 
neighboring countries. The Treaty itself consists of a preamble and fourteen 
articles. The preamble outlines the main features of the Treaty, stating that the 
alliance has been created for the defense of a way of life not only by military 
means, but also through co-operation in political, economic, social, and cultural 
fields.
The first two articles of the Treaty describe the aims and principles that 
member nations should follow in their conduct of foreign relations. Article one 
defines the basic principles to be followed by member countries in the conduct of
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their international relations in order to avoid endangering world peace and 
security. Article two defines the aims to be followed by the member countries in 
their international relations and indicates broadly how these aims should be 
fulfilled: through the preservation of peace, development of friendly relations 
among nations, achievement of international co-operation in solving international 
problems of an economic and social character.
Articles three and four outline the obligations of the signatories, providing 
clear authority for all co-operation of a non-military nature within the Alliance. 
These articles also serve to underline the fact that the alliance was brought into 
being to defend a way of life. Article three deals with the ways and means of 
maintaining and increasing the individual and collective capacity of members to 
resist armed attack. The signatories are encouraged to conduct joint actions and 
enact policies of mutual assistance. Article four lays down the obligations 
incumbent on member countries in the event of a threat to one of them. The 
only explicitly expressed requirement upon the signatories is an obligation to 
consult one another in the event that the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any member is endangered.
Articles five through eight refer to the North Atlantic Treaty's idea of collective 
defense. Article five serves to define the obligations of member countries in the 
event of an armed attack against one of them. Each country is free to decide 
what action it judges is necessary. In spite of an armed attack, the Treaty does 
not call for automatic declaration of war on the part of its members. Thomas 
Patterson suggests that the Alliance acts as a "trip wire" to possible
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aggressors. The Treaty provides for a collective reaction, but the members
use their own judgment as to what kind of response is required.
Article six defines the geographic area within which the provisions of Article 
five are applicable. However, the definition of a geographical area in ho way 
precludes discussion by the North Atlantic Council of events which occur outside 
that area. Article seven outlines the Treaty’s compatibility with the United 
Nations Charter, thus its justification under Article 51. In Article eight the 
signatories confirm the compatibility of the Treaty with their other international 
commitments, and undertake not to enter into any commitments in the future 
which may conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty.
Articles nine through thirteen focus on the creation of the North Atlantic 
Council, and the additional committees to assist in the implementation of Alliance 
policy, the accession of new members, and revisions of the Treaty. Article nine 
calls for the creation of the North Atlantic Council and provides for the setting up 
of whatever additional bodies may be needed to implement the preceding 
Articles. This article provides the legal basis for the existence of the specialized 
committees and groups set up by the North Atlantic Council, the International 
Secretariat which serves them, the major and subordinate military commands, 
and the various military and civilian agencies. Article 10 stipulates that the 
Parties may, by unanimous decision, invite any other European State in a 
position to further the principles of the Treaty to accede to it. Article 11 deals
Patterson et al.. American Foreign Relations. 296.
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with arrangements for ratification of the Treaty by member home governments 
and its entry into force. Articles 12 and 13 provide for the possibility of revisions 
to the Treaty or withdrawals from it. The final article simply deals with the 
arrangements for depositing and storing the Treaty document.
It was during the early years of the Alliance's existence that the basic 
foundations of the organization were established. These foundations included 
the North Atlantic Council, the Defense Planning Committee, the Nuclear 
Planning Group, Secretary General, the Military Committee, the Integrated 
Military structure, and the various other committees and planning groups.
North Atlantic Council
The highest authority within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the 
North Atlantic Council. It has powers of decision and effective political authority 
within the Organization. The Council is composed of representatives from each 
of the member countries who meet once a week in regular session. In addition 
to the control of the alliance, the North Atlantic Council also plays an important 
role in public affairs. The Council has an important "public profile and issues 
declarations and communiqués explaining its policies and decisions to the 
general public and to governments of countries which are not members of the
A l l ian ce .A cco rd ing  to Article Nine of the North Atlantic Treaty, the North 
Atlantic Council is the only body within NATO that derives its power expressly
NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press,
1995), 93.
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from the Treaty. This article also provides the Council vyith the power to create 
subsidiary bodies — committees and planning groups -- to help carry out the 
work of the Council
The Council is composed of Permanent Representatives from all sixteen of 
the member countries, each representative holding the rank of Ambassador (see 
figure 1). The decisions of the Council are the expressed concerns of member 
governments. All of the members have an equal stake in the policies that are 
formed. As each of these members are sovereign nation-states, decisions of the 
Council are formed based on common consent rather than formal voting. Topics 
of discussion at these meetings frequently include reports that have been 
prepared by the subordinate committees and planning groups regarding all 
manner of activities.
Secretary General 
The chairman of the North Atlantic Council is the Secretary General. In 
addition to the duties as chairman of this Council, the Secretary General is also 
the chairman of the Defense Planning Committee, the Nuclear Planning Group, 
and the other senior committees within the Organization. The Secretary General 
has the power to propose items for discussion and decision during any of the 
meetings as well as the utilization of his good offices to mediate disputes among 
the member countries. The Secretary General also acts as the spokesperson to 
the media and the member governments for the organization. The Secretary 
General acts as “principal spokesman of the Organization, both in its external
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relations and in communications and contacts between member
14
governments. Directly under the Secretary General's control is the 
International Staff. Their responsibility includes managing the day-to-day affairs 
of the Alliance and assisting the Secretary General.
Defense Planning Committee 
The Defense Planning Committee is responsible for matters relating to the 
implementation of collective defense planning. This committee is composed of 
Defense Ministers from the various member countries. The committee provides 
recommendations and policy guidelines to the Military Committee. With the 
exception of France, all of the members are seated on this committee.
Nuclear Planning Group 
This group is the main arena for discussions relating to the role of nuclear 
forces within NATO. The Nuclear Planning Group is the principal forum for 
"consultations on all matters relating to the role of nuclear forces in NATO's
security and defense policies."^ Similar to the Defense Planning Committee, 
this group meets at the level of Defense Ministers twice a year. All member 
countries participate in the discussions, except France and Iceland who 
participate as observers.
Ibid.. 96. 
Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Military Committee 
This committee provides recommendations to NATO's political authorities 
regarding common defense and guidance to the commanders within NATO. The 
committee helps to provide advice to the Secretary General, the Nuclear 
Planning Group, the Defense Planning Committee, and the North Atlantic 
Council. The Military Committee is composed of Chiefs of Staff from the 
member countries. France provides a military mission, and since Iceland has no 
military, it provides a civilian observer.
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Integrated Military Structure
The Integrated Military Structure provides the organizational framework for
defending the member countries. Included in this structure is a network of major
commands covering the North Atlantic area. Following a series of streamlining
measures in 1994, the number of commands in NATO was reduced. These
measures left NATO with two major commands, Allied Command Europe and
Allied Command Atlantic. Thus, the strategic area covered by the North Atlantic
consists of the two commands (Europe and the Atlantic) and a regional United
States - Canada Planning Group (see figure 2).
At the top of the command pyramid is the Supreme Allied Commander
Europe (SACEUR). This individual is responsible for maintaining the peace and
security of the Alliance and controlling Allied Command Europe. The NATO
Handbook describes the primary task of SACEUR which,
...is to contribute to preserving the peace, security, and territorial 
integrity of Alliance member states. SACEUR is responsible for 
identifying and requesting the forces required to promote stability, 
contribute to crisis management and provide effective defense in
accordance with his mandate.
In the event of armed aggression against the Alliance, SACEUR is responsible 
for maintaining the territorial integrity of the member states. The Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe is also the principal spokesman for the Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). In addition to these duties the
Ibid., 169.
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commander is also responsible for providing the North Atlantic Council with 
information about the progress, in military terms, of NATO's other projects.
The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe’s single command is Allied 
Command Europe (ACE). The task of this command is the defense of Western 
Europe, an area extending from Norway to Southern Europe, including the 
Mediterranean Sea, and from the Atlantic Coastline to the border of Turkey. The 
total area of defense "equates to nearly two million square kilometers of land, 
more than three million square kilometers of sea, and a population of about 320
million people." Included within ACE are three major commands; Allied Forces 
North West Europe (AFNORTHWEST), Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), 
and Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH). In each of these three 
commands there are three subordinate commands, one sub-command for 
ground forces, another for air units, and another for naval assets.
The headquarters of Allied Forces North West Europe is located in High 
Wycombe, United Kingdom. This command is responsible for the defense of 
Norway, the United Kingdom, and the adjacent sea zones. The commander of 
Allied Forces North West Europe is a four star British general. The headquarters 
of Allied Forces Central Europe is located in Brunssum, The Netherlands. This 
command is responsible for defending the area south of AFNORTHWEST to the 
southern German border. The commander of Allied Forces Central Europe is a 
German four star general. The headquarters for Allied Forces Southern Europe
Ibid., 170.
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is located in Naples, Italy. This command is responsible for the defense of 
Italy, Greece, Turkey, the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea, and the Straits of 
Gibraltar. Allied Forces Southern Europe's commander is an American four star 
admiral.
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Additional Committees 
In addition to the above mentioned committees a number of smaller 
committees and planning groups have been created. The responsibilities of 
these planning groups and committees include the standardization of armaments 
among NATO members, scientific concerns, economic issues, budget 
committees, and communication and information systems. In addition to these 
committees, a number of new entities have been created to deal with issues that 
have only recently developed following the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. In 
particular a number of committees has been established to monitor the 
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery 
systems. Other committees have been created to monitor the progress of new 
NATO projects, such as the Partnership for Peace and the concept of Combined 
Joint Taskforces.
History
From 1949 to Todav 
Following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty two issues were left 
unresolved. The first of these issues involved the level of United States' support 
to the new Organization. One observer, Stanley Sloan, noted that the treaty 
"neither suggested the institutional framework for US involvement nor specified 
whether the US military contribution would consist primarily of strategic bombing 
and naval capabilities or whether it would also include substantial US ground
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forces in Europe."^^ The second unresolved issue focused on the role that 
Germany would be playing in this new European security framework. The treaty 
did not stipulate whether or not Germany would be allowed to rearm, and if so, to 
what level. In 1949, the priorities of the leading powers within NATO (Britain, the 
United States, and France) were all different. All three agreed that the purpose 
of the organization was to counter-balance Soviet power in Europe and to 
successfully integrate West Germany, but the disagreement stemmed from the 
manner in which these goals would be accomplished.
In Paris, policy was designed to limit the future military capability of the new 
German army. In Washington, the government was more concerned with 
balancing the power of the Soviet Union in Central Europe. From the American 
perspective, Sloan further notes that "German industrial capabilities and 
manpower were assets which could not be overlooked, particularly given
19
Germany's geographic position in the center of Europe." In London, the 
government was unwilling to maintain a large presence of troops in Central 
Europe to off-set potential German power. The end result was a conflict of 
interests between France and the United States, with Britain watching from the 
sidelines. The American government preferred that France, Britain, Germany, 
and the other continental powers provide the bulk of the ground forces, while the
Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future: Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain 
(Washington D C.: National Defense University Press, 1985), 7.
Ibid., 8.
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United States would provide strategic bombing and the Alliance’s nuclear 
weapons. Allowing Germany to join NATO would serve to legitimize German 
rearmament. The French on the other hand were totally against the rearming of 
Germany, preferring instead to see American ground forces stationed on the 
Eastern borders. The solution to this problem came in a somewhat unusual 
fashion.
On June 25, 1950, without a declaration of war, the armies of the North
Korean People's Republic crossed the 38th parallel to attack the Republic of
20
Korea. The ensuing conflict, half-way around the world served as the catalyst
for moving Franco-American political concerns beyond the question of Germany
and resolving the differing points of view. The resolution was as follows:
The United States would deploy substantial ground forces to 
Western Europe and place them within an integrated NATO 
command structure. This integrated command structure would 
serve the practical role of coordinating Western defense efforts in 
Europe as well as providing the crucial Atlantic framework for 
bringing German military forces into the Western defense against
the Soviet Union.
The agreement marked a drastic change in American foreign policy; American 
troops would be stationed in Europe indefinitely. In addition to the commitment 
of US troops, the Truman administration was gambling on the acceptance by 
Europeans of the rearmament of Germany.
NATO Facts and Figures. 30. 
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Later that year, the NATO members decided to create an integrated 
European defense force with a single allied commander. During the course of 
this meeting, the Council resolved to place an American officer in charge of the 
Supreme Allied Headquarters. The Council's choice for this new position was 
General Dwight D Eisenhower, and on December 19, the appointment was made 
public. Prior to this decision the Council had been given a report that outlined 
methods of strengthening the Alliance through the expansion of membership. 
During the course of the next year, the Council met in Lisbon to discuss the 
manpower goals that the Alliance should set. The meetings culminated with a 
decision to create a total of 50 divisions of infantry, tanks, and artillery, over 
4,000 aircraft, and strong naval forces. In addition to setting the manpower 
goals, the Lisbon meeting formally welcomed the accession of Greece and 
Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
In 1954, at meetings held in Paris, a series of agreements was reached 
regarding the status of West Germany. The Paris Agreements accomplished a 
number of different tasks. First, the agreements normalized relations between 
the NATO allies and the Federal Republic of Germany. Second the agreements 
terminated the occupation regime in the Federal Republic of Germany. Next the 
agreements recognized West Germany as a sovereign nation-state, and finally, 
invited West Germany to join NATO. In May 1955, the Federal Republic of 
Germany acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty. In response, the Soviet Union 
concluded the Warsaw Treaty with its European satellites, Albania, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany (granted the prerogatives of a state in late
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December, 1955, by the Soviet Union), Hungary, Poland, and Romania. The 
formation of the Warsaw Pact ushered in a relatively calm period for Europe, a 
return to the balance of power.
In 1966, French President Charles de Gaulle formally withdrew his country 
from NATO’s integrated military command structure and asked that NATO 
remove its forces, headquarters, and facilities from French soil. De Gaulle
ordered the removal of "American nuclear weapons from French soil,” and,
22
“withdrew the French fleet from the integrated NATO command." The basis for 
this decision was the difference of opinion that existed between France and the 
United States. From the beginning, according to Sloan, "France had 
substantially different objectives for and interests in the Atlantic alliance than did
23
the United States." In the eyes of the French government, the structure of the 
Alliance subordinated France to a position no greater than that of West 
Germany. France would still participate in the Alliance and maintain its treaty 
obligations, but would remove its forces from the integrated military command.
At the time, the action taken by France was seen to have little effect on the 
Organization; however, this was not the case.
Despite the general opinion of the time, the move by France did have some 
consequences. In a military sense, the French decision to withdraw weakened 
the lines of communication and supply. The infrastructure for the movement of
Kissinger, Diplomacy. 612
23
Sloan, NATO's Future. 35.
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supplies to the front line was now moved closer to the front, making them more 
vulnerable to an attack. The political consequences of the French action 
included an increased European dependence upon the United States for 
leadership, coming at a time when the economic might of Europe was 
strengthening the European position in the Alliance. Another consequence of 
France’s action was to increase the role of West Germany in the Alliance.
One year after the departure of France from the integrated military command 
structure, NATO implemented a new policy with regard to the use of nuclear 
weapons. The Alliance's original strategy had been based on the notion of 
"massive retaliation." This doctrine had been put forth by US Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles, and Henry Kissinger notes that it was based on the idea 
’’that rather than resist aggression where it occurred, the United States would 
retaliate against the source of the trouble at a time and with weapons of its own
24
choosing." In response to this dated nuclear defense policy, NATO adopted 
the doctrine of flexible response. The flexible response strategy called for the 
gradual increase in the amount of force used in any given conflict. According to 
the new strategy, in Stanley Sloan’s assessment, "NATO would be prepared to 
meet any level of aggression with equivalent force, conventional or nuclear, and
25
would increase the level of force, if necessary, to end the conflict." This new 
policy did not completely mitigate the differences of opinion within the alliance
24
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about its nuclear strategy, but it did provide a formula that helped to reconcile 
some of the differences.
On the eve of NATO’s twentieth birthday, questions were being raised as to 
the Alliance’s viability in the atmosphere of East-West détente -  a period of 
relaxed tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States. In response 
to the growing concern about NATO’s future, the North Atlantic Council 
commissioned a year-long study to examine the future tasks of the alliance. This 
study became known as the Harmel Report. This report outlined two main 
functions of the Alliance. The first function was to "maintain adequate military
strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure
26
and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur”
The second and newly assigned function was "to pursue the search for progress 
towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be
27
solved ” The North Atlantic Council adopted the views of the Harmel Report in 
December, 1967.
The report helped to bridge the growing gap between the defense of the 
West and continued détente. At a meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, the Harmel 
Report was translated into alliance policy that called for force reductions in both 
the East and West. This meeting marked the beginning of NATO’s role in arms- 
control negotiations. By adopting the ideas of the report, the alliance was able to
Ibid., 45. 
Ibid.
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revitalize its foundations. The Harmel Report "reiterated NATO's commitment
to maintain a strong defense, but it broadened substantially the goals of the
28
alliance." In essence, this report provided the Alliance with a lease on life and 
a renewed sense of purpose.
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, concern was being raised about the 
role of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. The Soviet Union had 
begun deployment of a new class of missile, the 88-20. James Nathan and 
James Oliver provide the following assessment of the 88-20:
It could be MIRVed [multiple independently targetable reentry 
vehicle]: it was mobile; and it had an all-terrain tractor carrier that 
could move the missile caisson, thereby immensely complicating 
Western attempts to locate the weapons. It had substantial 
accuracy, and each of its three warheads had very high yields of 
over two hundred kilotons.
In response to this new threat, NATO decided to bring new ground-launched
nuclear cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles to Europe. However, the
deployment of these missiles was not welcome news to the citizens of Western
Europe. Throughout the early 1980s public demonstrations were taking place in
West Germany, France, Holland, and Britain to protest NATO’s deployment of
these weapon systems.
As the deployment deadline approached, negotiations were held between the
8oviet Union and the United States in an effort to reduce the intermediate-range
28
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James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, United States Foreign Policy and 
World Order (Delaware: Harper Colliens Publishers, 1989), 409.
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nuclear forces in Europe. The result of the negotiations was a treaty signed in 
Reykjavik, Iceland, which eliminated Intermediate-range nuclear forces from 
Europe. In signing this treaty, the United States forced NATO to become more 
dependent on conventional forces and their own "delegitimized" nuclear
30
weapons. Some members of the Alliance have expressed concern about 
being displaced from the US nuclear umbrella, having to rely increasingly on 
conventional forces. With the shrinkage of US forces in the European theater, 
NATO's future has begun to rest increasingly upon the Europeans.
Shortly after the signing of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces 
Agreement, the Eastern Bloc began to collapse. One by one the Soviet Union's 
former satellite countries began to break away, until finally the Soviet Union itself 
disintegrated, forming a loose confederation of states. In 1989 the symbol of a 
divided Europe, the Berlin Wall, was brought down, and Germany was reunited 
in 1990. A new era of peace has been ushered into Europe, leaving the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization searching for a new role.
Ibid., 412.
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CHAPTER 3
ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING AN EXPANDED NATO
New Missions for NATO
Consequences of the End of the Cold War 
The end of the Cold War marked the collapse of a relatively stable, bipolar 
system of Soviet-American confrontation. Gerhard Wettig, Director of 
International Relations and International Security Research at the Federal 
Institute of East European and International Studies in Cologne, describes the 
bipolar system as one based on mutual deterrence. He writes the following 
assessment:
During the Cold War period Western countries protected 
themselves against the military threat emanating from the Soviet 
bloc by establishing a military counterpoise within the framework of 
NATO, making any reversion to military force by the other side 
seem too hazardous. A relationship of mutual deterrence evolved, 
which functioned on account of the fact that both sides pooled and 
thus controlled respective forces and tendencies. Under these
conditions, the sole aim was to guarantee mutual deterrence.
The breakdown of this system of mutual deterrence resulted in the creation of a 
multi-polar, highly unstable Europe. As a result of the fragmentation of state 
power, a new period of instability has been ushered into Europe. The lack of 
clearly defined sides has created a number of problems in Europe. Two
Gerhard Wettig, "A New Type of Challenge to European Security,” Aussen 
Politik 46 (2nd Quarter 1995): 137.
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scholars in the field of international relations, John Spanier and Steven W.
Hook, contend that the uncertain balance of power has brought instability to 
Europe in four different ways.
First, the revival of ethnic tensions and nationalist movements within Eastern 
and Central Europe marks the first consequence of the end of the Cold War.
The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe has revived nationalistic, 
religious, and ethnic tensions in the area. According to Spanier and Hook, these 
tensions are similar to “those that accompanied the breakup of the Austro-
Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman empires after World War I and that had kept
2
Eastern Europe in turmoil throughout the intenwar period." Soviet control and 
domination of Eastern and Central Europe after World War II prevented conflicts 
of this nature from erupting by suppressing national aspirations and claims with 
the Soviet army. The consequences of the revival of these tensions have ranged 
from the peaceful division of Czechoslovakia to the violent disintegration of 
Yugoslavia.
A second result of the end of the Cold War has been the breakup of the 
Soviet Union into separate republics. In the aftermath of the breakup, tensions 
and violence appeared among the successor states of the Soviet Union. The 
majority of the violence focused on Russian minorities in these new republics 
and the new republics’ ethnic tensions with each other. According to Spanier
 ̂John Spanier and Steven W. Hook, American Foreign Policy Since World 
War 11 (Washington D C.: CQ Press, 1995), 299.
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and Hook, these tensions served to renew fears of “Russian imperialism within 
the old Soviet frontiers as Russian leaders used the alleged dangers to Russian
minorities in these states as a pretext for military action.” The uncertain future 
of Russia itself has remained a critical concern for Europe, and will be examined 
in more detail later.
The third consequence of the end of the superpower rivalry was the clear 
field left for aspirants to pursue their own designs for regional hegemony. The 
scholars claim that it was no longer the case that “each superpower, dominant in
4
its own sphere, could restrain its respective clients and prevent local conflicts.” 
The rise in frequency of regional conflicts around the world serves to illustrate 
the problem. The attempts by Serbia to exert control over large portions of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrate the seriousness of this problem. The problem 
of regional hegemony has also been particularly prevalent in the Middle East and 
South East Asia where various governments have become more assertive in 
their regional and international policies.
The final consequence of the end of the Cold War has been its effect on the 
alliances created to counter the Soviet Union’s power abroad. Lacking a clearly 
defined enemy, the various alliances — NATO in particular -  have been faced 
with increasingly blurred missions. Spanier and Hook argue that not only had 
NATO’s “raison d’être vanished, but the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and
 ̂Ibid.
" Ibid.
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5 51the Soviet Union had given priority to economic objectives." These new
economic objectives have been characterized by the competition between the
European, the North American, and the Asian trading blocs.
The problems that have arisen since the collapse of the Soviet Union
seriously threaten the stability of Europe. By expanding NATO to include the
countries of Eastern and Central Europe, stability could be brought to an
otherwise tumultuous region. According to Jeffrey Simon, a senior fellow at the
Institute for National Strategic Studies, and others, an expanded NATO could
provide a number of other security related missions beyond the role of simply
deterring and defending an attack against Western Europe. In an article
published in Orbis. Simon claims that an expanded NATO could continue to
perform, the vital roles of anchoring the northern and southern flanks of Europe,
maintaining regional stability, and embedding Germany in a multi-lateral,
transatlantic security structure.^ Additionally, an expanded alliance could also 
prevent the re-nationalization of European defense policy and may provide the 
potential for participation in out-of-area actions.
Agent of regional stabilitv 
The collapse of the bipolar order in Europe has led to a rise in the trend of 
regionalism. Two scholars in the field, Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne,
 ̂ Ibid., 300.
 ̂Jeffrey Simon, "Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO," Orbis 37 (Winter 
1993); 21.
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describe regionalism as a “state-led or states-led project designed to reorganized^
a particular regional space along defined economic and political l i n e s . A s  
stated earlier, one of the consequences of the end of the superpower rivalry was 
the clear field left for aspirants to pursue their own designs for regional 
hegemony. Howard E. Frost, a Washington-based international security affairs 
analyst, describes the situation as a security vacuum.
The concept of a security vacuum is intended to refer to “the region’s lack of 
international structure, uncertain democracies, weak economies, ethnic strife,
and potentially troublesome neighbors In an effort to deal with the “security
vacuum” Central and East European countries have signed numerous
agreements dealing with cooperation, friendship, and trade. Should the alliance
decide to refrain from expanding to include all of Eastern Europe, the fall-out
could be particularly disastrous. On this subject, Jeffrey Simon writes;
...if the new eastern democracies are not soon given a hope of 
eventual security within a broader NATO, they may come to feel 
rejected, to look elsewhere, or to succumb to internal reactionary 
forces. Efforts to create liberal democracies in the Central and 
East European area will then diminish, and much of the West’s
investment in the cold war will be squandered.
 ̂Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne, Regionalism and World Order (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 2.
 ̂Howard E. Frost, "Eastern Europe's Search for Security," Orbis 37 (Winter 
1993): 37.
 ̂Jeffrey Simon, "Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO," 21.
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At present, many Eastern and Central European countries have begun to find 
other avenues with which to ensure their security. Rather than waiting for the 
European Community and NATO to accept them, these countries have signed 
separate bilateral and multilateral accords. The agreement signed in February 
1991, between Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic on regional
cooperation and mutual support represents one example. ° This trend could act 
to increase regional tensions.
In an effort to curtail the de-stabilizing effects of numerous regional 
arrangements, NATO could act as an agent of regional stability. By expanding 
the alliance eastward, Central and East European countries would have no 
reason to look beyond NATO for security guarantees. Simon contends that the 
future of European security will be directly affected by “the relationships now 
forming among states that arose from the old USSR, and it is particularly
affected by the degree to which those relationships are cooperative or
11
competitive.” Even more than many Western European states. Central and 
Eastern European states see NATO as the fundamental European security 
institution capable of providing stability in the region.
Howard E. Frost, "Eastern Europe's Search for Security," 52. 
Jeffrey Simon, "Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO," 23.
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Burden Sharing and De-Nationalization 
Another mission for the alliance would likely involve the continued de­
nationalization of defense policies. Simon claims that de-nationalization has 
been one of NATO’s greatest achievements, and has contributed to building 
confidence and stability among the European nations. De-nationalization is the 
process whereby a country's defense policy is openly shown to its allies, thereby 
preventing insecurities from arising among neighbors. Simon is of the opinion
that if NATO were to “atrophy and wither away, re-nationalization of defense
12
planning might occur and old suspicions might resurface." The problem would 
be particularly serious in light of German reunification and Germany’s neighbors’ 
suspicions. Re-nationalization could also have negative repercussions between 
such allies as Greece and Turkey.
A key factor related to the de-nationalization of defense policies is defense 
burden sharing among members within the alliance. The former secretary 
general of NATO, Manfred Worner, contends that as NATO’s forces are 
restructured and scaled down, the burden of European defense needs to be 
shouldered equally by all members, both current and new ones. Worner 
emphasizes that as force reductions take place, there needs to be “an equitable 
shouldering of the roles, risks, and responsibilities of our common defense," 
which will require “the continued presence of Canadian and US forces in
Ibid., 24.
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Europe." Through burden sharing, the alliance could better maintain a sense 
of equality among members.
Force for unity in Europe 
A further mission of an expanded NATO might involve helping to unite 
Europe. Because Iceland, Turkey, and Norway are not members of the 
European Community, NATO plays an important role as the one institution that 
anchors those states both to Europe and to a credible security arrangement. 
Additionally, as Eastern Europe is brought into the fold, some countries that are 
invited to become members of NATO may elect to remain outside of the 
European Community. In the unlikely event that this were to take place, NATO 
could play an important role in keeping non-EC member states attached to a 
pan-European organization.
If NATO is allowed to disintegrate slowly, the repercussions could have very 
serious consequences. Simon claims that should NATO wither away, “insecurity 
and identity crisis would likely be the result, first on Europe’s flanks and then
throughout all of Europe. In short, to maintain a strong European security 
organization -  and thus a strong and peaceful European community — the 
connection between non-European EC members, Canada, and the United 
States must be continued.
David Bender and Bruno Leone, Eastern Europe: Opposing Viewpoints 
(San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press Inc., 1990), 255.
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Involvement in Out of Area Actions 
Out-of-area actions represent another arena in which an expanded NATO 
could have a role. Former President Richard Nixon sees European defense as 
NATO’s “core mission, " but views participation in out-of-area actions as its
15
“cutting edge.’’ According to Nixon, NATO’s creators had not intended to limit
the alliance to strict boundaries. Rather, the creators had limited the business of
NATO to North American and European security concerns. The subsequent
globalization of interests has made it necessary to consider Western security
concerns in the context of the entire planet. Nixon writes:
...its [NATO’s] creators did not envision that by specifying that the 
NATO commitment applied to Europe and North America, the 
alliance would operate only within a strict boundary. Instead, they 
simply sought to exclude Europe’s colonies from security 
guarantees requiring an automatic response from other members.
Today, as demonstrated in the Persian Gulf, challenges to Western
interests can arise half a world away.
The process of globalization has forced nations to think of their security in terms 
of their neighbors, their international trading partners, and the sources of their 
strategic raw materials.
Typically, NATO’s “area” has been associated with Europe, however, the 
allies of the southern tier (Turkey, Italy, France, Spain, and Greece) see the 
region to their south as the new security concern. Simon couples the concern
David Bender and Bruno Leone, Europe: Current Controversies (San 
Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press Inc., 1992), 247.
Ibid.
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with the region to the new threat of "North African/Middle Eastern radical 
fundamentalism linked with nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
proliferation and advanced delivery s y s t e m s T h e  spread of these systems to 
the region potentially allows these countries to strike targets in Southern Europe 
with little or no warning.
Further potential for participation in out-of-area action includes assistance 
with peacekeeping operations and maintaining forward-deployed material for 
other operations. The NATO-led operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, IFOR 
(Implementation Force), is an example of an out-of-area, peacekeeping 
operation. During the deployment of forces and equipment to Saudi Arabia and 
the Gulf to participate in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, about one half of. 
NATO’s pre-positioned assets were sent to the region. Without these pre­
positioned assets, the coalition’s buildup of forces would have taken significantly 
longer. Though the alliance itself may not participate directly in out-of-area 
actions, Simon contends that “the alliance will likely provide the necessary back­
ground conditions for implementing such actions. ” Along the same lines, 
former President Nixon argues that for NATO to participate successfully in out- 
of-area actions improvement would need to take place in three areas.
17 Jeffrey Simon, European Security Policy After the Revolutions of 1989 
(Washington D.C.: The National Defense University Press, 1991), 617.
Jeffrey Simon, "Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO," 25.
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The first area of improvement focuses on the development of rapid reaction 
forces. Nixon is of the opinion that the European members of NATO should 
develop a "joint rapid deployment force that would function, depending on 
circumstances, independently or under an integrated command with similar US
19
forces.” Though not under NATO control, the formation of the Euro-brigade (a 
joint military effort between Germany and France) is a step in the direction 
toward the formation of a rapid reaction force.
The second area of improvement relates to the relationship between the 
United States, Europe, and the underdeveloped countries of the world. Nixon
states that the United States should "welcome European activism in parts of the
20
underdeveloped world where their historical experience exceeds our own.” 
Closely related is Nixon’s idea that the United States should open its overseas 
bases outside Europe and allow NATO allies access to them. According to
Nixon, opening the bases would “facilitate greater European activism in critical
21
parts of the underdeveloped world.’
Finally, the alliance should develop “better mechanisms for more coordinated
crisis management,” particularly in light of Europe’s handling of the events
22
leading up to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Combined, the members of
David Bender and Bruno Leone, Europe: Current Controversies, 248. 
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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NATO wield tremendous economic, political, and military might and could use 
this power to influence the decisions of other countries. Through cooperation, 
the allies could present a course of action in the United Nations, or on their own, 
that a potential aggressor would have no choice but to take notice of.
The expansion of membership to Eastern and Central Europe could provide a 
number of important new missions for the alliance. According to Simon, it could 
continue to perform the vital roles of maintaining regional stability and 
embedding Germany in a multi-lateral, transatlantic security apparatus. An 
expanded alliance could also prevent the re-nationalization of European defense 
policy, anchor the northern and southern flanks of Europe, and provide a 
credible capability for potential participation in out-of-area actions.
The New Russia
Instabilitv and Democratization 
Despite Russia’s moves toward a democratic society, many countries — 
particularly those countries in Eastern Europe — feel that Russia is still a threat to 
European security. In a study conducted by Edward D. Mansfield and Jack 
Snyder, they found that the process of democratization is a dangerous one and 
often leads to conflict. Their study compared the process of democratization in 
various countries to the probability of conflict occurring during the 
democratization process.
The study first classified a variety of national regimes as either democracies, 
autocracies, or mixed regimes -  a state with features of both. The scholars then
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
defined a democratizing state as one which is moving from either a mixed or 
autocratic regime to a democratic one. At this point, the researchers analyzed 
the likelihood of these democratizing states going to war during their political 
transition. The results of their analysis showed that “democratizing states were 
more likely to fight wars than were states that had undergone no change in
23
regime’’ type. This result applies to both the autocratic and mixed regimes, as 
well as democratic ones. According to Mansfield and Snyder the relationship is
24
“weakest one year into democratization and strongest at ten years.” During 
that ten-year period, the likelihood of a given state going to war was one chance 
in six. In light of Russia’s formidable military power, the study is somewhat 
disconcerting, especially to Russia’s neighbors. Despite the disappearance of • 
the Soviet Union, the Russian government still commands an army of more than 
1 million troops, the largest of any European nation, and thus remains a threat to 
European stability.
The Threat of a Resurgent Russia 
According to Robert E. Hunter, the director of European Studies at the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, the Soviet Union will “remain the premier 
security concern in Europe — the leading threat...to stability and predictability on
Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and War,” 
Foreign Affairs 74 (May/June 1995): 81.
Ibid.
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the C o n t i n e n t . T h i s  fact is especially disconcerting in light of Russia’s
possession of a large nuclear arsenal. The internal stability of Russia is of
particular concern to Western leaders, especially since little can be done by
them to influence the situation. On the subject of the West’s inability to influence
Russia’s internal stability, Robert E. Hunter writes;
That fact [the West’s inability to influence Russia’s internal stability] 
makes the possibility of turmoil a matter of great danger, both 
because there can be no assurances thgt internal strife could be 
contained within today’s Soviet frontiers and because classic 
policies of deterrence might prove ineffective under circumstances
of revolution in a state armed with so many nuclear weapons.
Related to the subject of internal stability are the questions surrounding the 
ethnic Russians living outside of Russia’s borders.
The Russian government’s unflinching support for its minorities abroad has 
also raised questions about a resurgent Russia. The support for these 
Individuals has also prompted new fears of Russian imperialism. According to 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, “the imperial impulse remains strong and even appears to
27
be strengthening. ” The Russian deployment of troops to the republic of 
Chechnya in 1994 served to flame these fears of an imperialist Russia. The
Robert E. Hunter, “The Future of European Security, “The Washingtori 
Quarterly 13 (Autumn 1990): 60.
Ibid., 61.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Premature Partnership,” Foreign Affairs 
(March/April 1994): 72.
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belief was that if Russia were successful in its operation in Chechnya, the 
government might see an opportunity to expand to other areas.
The relationship between Eastern Europe and Russia is similar to that of 
Russia and its former republics. The countries of Eastern Europe are fearful of a 
resurgent Russia intent on reviving its former superpower status at the expense 
of its neighbors. Expansion of NATO to include the countries of Eastern Europe 
would calm these fears. By integrating these countries into a larger NATO 
stability in the region could be assured. Additionally, by encouraging the Eastern 
European countries to adopt Western norms and behaviors, these countries 
could become more productive and responsible, thus contributing to a secure 
and stable Europe.
Basis for a Broader Security Framework
European Security Organization 
The future of European security will depend greatly on the ability of Western 
Europe to integrate the emerging nations of Central and Eastern Europe. A 
prominent scholar in the field of international security, Malcolm Chalmers, has 
put forward his own idea for dealing with post-Cold War European security 
concerns. In an article published in the World Policy Journal, Chalmers 
advocates the creation of a broader European security framework, the European 
Security Organization (ESQ). The organization would incorporate all of the 
current members of NATO as well as the former members of the Warsaw Pact.
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Chalmers contends that the establishment of the ESO would “symbolize and 
seal the unity of the continent” in a number of different ways.
To begin with, it would provide a framework within which the West could 
embrace the newly independent countries of Central and Eastern Europe without 
diluting the ultimate objective of the European Union: political unification. In 
joining the ESO, Eastern and Western Europe would have accepted the need to 
develop common security policies. Eventually, the process of communication 
between East and West could be broadened to include additional, non-security 
issues, such as economic, social, and political concerns.
Additionally, the ESO would continue to embed Germany in multi-lateral 
security arrangements, thus curbing fears of conflict between Germany and its . 
neighbors. Just as NATO and the Warsaw Pact have done in the past, the ESO 
would limit Germany’s room for maneuver in security policy issues. The 
framework of the ESO would not seek to place limits on German sovereignty that 
other member nations were not expected to accept for themselves. Though 
fears of a resurgent Germany could still exist, over time, successful German 
membership in the ESO would help to alleviate those fears.
Finally, the ESO would bring the security structure of Europe into line with the 
new concepts of “common security.” Common security is the idea that instability 
anywhere in Europe threatens the stability of Europe as a whole. As all of the
Malcolm Chalmers, “Beyond the Alliance System: The Case for a 
European Security Organization,” World Policv Journal 7 (Spring 1990): 228.
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members of NATO and the former members of the Warsaw Pact would be 
members in the new security organization, the chances of conflict between East 
and West would be greatly reduced. “By creating an all-European security 
organization, it will be possible to extend the principle of collective security, as it
has been practiced within NATO, to all of Europe,” Chalmers contends.^^
Control of the ESO would be maintained primarily by Europeans. Instead of 
having an American or Russian commander -  as was the case in NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact -  the post of supreme military commander would rotate among the 
European members of ESO. Chalmers asserts that although Europeans would 
“take the leading role" in administration of the new organization, participation by 
the United States would be important, as “its [United States] security is closely .
30
bound up with what happens in Europe." In this light, the total disengagement 
of the US from Europe would not be in the best interests of either Americans or 
Europeans. The debate would then center on what the United States’ 
commitment should be and how much they should contribute to the new 
organization. Chalmers contends that “for the foreseeable future, a modest US
„31
presence is an important safeguard against uncertainty.
Once created, the ESO would take over a number of functions that are 
currently performed by NATO, the WEU, and the CSCE. In addition to these
Ibid.. 229. 
Ibid., 232. 
Ibid., 233.
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functions, one of the ESO’s first tasks would be to provide its members with a 
military guarantee that their borders could not be changed through the use of 
force. Despite the political weight that ethnic and national affiliations carry, the 
ESO would make clear that under no circumstances are borders to be changed 
using this method. However, the ESO would have to establish clear guidelines 
for what constitutes national self-determination versus conquering territory by
32
force. In essence, the ESO would act as a mechanism for maintaining the 
territorial status quo, or at least ensuring that changes take place only under 
mutually agreed conditions. The admittance of Russia brings an interesting 
question to the table. Russia is both a European and an Asian power, therefore, 
how far do the borders of “Europe” and subsequently ESO extend?
At some point in the future, Russia may seek support from its European allies 
regarding disputes in Asia. Chalmers addresses this point by stating that there 
are several reasons why it would be unwise for the ESO to take on the task of
33
guaranteeing Russia's Asian borders. First, Russia is currently involved in 
disputes with both China and Japan over its eastern borders. Subsequently, 
Europeans would be unwilling to become involved in an ongoing dispute with the 
two most powerful nations in Asia. Second, by broadening the theory of the ESO 
to include Asia, the shadow of European hegemony would be cast in a region in 
which it should not be cast. According to Chalmers, a wider concept for the ESO
Ibid., 237. 
Ibid., 245.
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would “undoubtedly fuel suspicions among the Asian powers that the new 
European alliance would become an instrument for global hegemony by the
‘Northern’ or ‘white’ nations The final reason that Chalmers outlines focuses 
on the likelihood that nations of the Middle East would ultimately react in much 
the same way as Asian nations. The end result is that, if the ESO will have a 
role in guaranteeing Russia’s European borders, it will have to make other 
arrangements for territorial guarantees to the south and east.
A second function for the new organization could involve the verification and 
implementation of arms control agreements. Entrusting arms control 
implementation monitoring to the ESO would represent a practical way of 
involving the defense ministries and armed forces of Russia, the United States, - 
and all European nations in a common task. Related to the task of arms control 
monitoring is the task of adapting the military structures of member nations. To 
accomplish the adaptation of military structures, Chalmers advocates the
35
creation of a system of “defensive defense ” He describes this system as one 
that envisions a force structure that is “sufficient for deterring invasion but cannot
itself be used for aggression ” Adoption of “defensive defense ” postures would 
help to reassure all the nations of Europe, members and non-members alike, 
that the remaining armed forces had the sole role of maintaining the territorial
Ibid.
Ibid.. 240.
Ibid.
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status quo. In addition to modifying the military structures, the ESO would also 
expand confidence building measures, such as military information and 
personnel exchanges.
Chalmers contends that the creation of an all-European security organization 
is not only a realistic goal, but also the best way to ensure a “secure and 
prosperous future for Europe as the bipolar division of the continent comes to an
37
end." According to Chalmers the potential benefits to Europe for the creation
of an organization of this kind are numerous and great. He writes that,
...the ESO would institutionalize common security, and thus help 
prevent a new division of Europe into two or three opposing blocs.
It would safeguard the new democracies of Eastern Europe against 
Soviet intervention, and thus formalize the end of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine. And it would address the concern...that German unity 
could lead, in time, to military expansionism. The creation of ESO 
would also remove one of the major obstacles to the full political 
and economic integration of Eastern Europe...into the European
Community.
In short, the ESO would help to accelerate the process of European integration 
which is at least as crucial to a lasting peace as the security structures 
themselves.
Ibid., 247. 
Ibid., 248.
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CHAPTER 4
PROBLEMS SURROUNDING AN EXPANDED NATO
Antagonizing Russia
Relations with Russia 
In an article analyzing the American stake in Russia, Alvin Z Rubinstein 
provides an assessment of US policy regarding NATO’s expansion and Russia’s
objections to that expansion/ The author begins his analysis of NATO’s
proposed expansion with a look at the Partnership For Peace (PFP), an initiative
put forward by NATO following the end of the Cold War. This US backed policy
of military cooperation now comprises more than two dozen countries, including
former Soviet republics which have joined. The author’s contention is that
important parallels can be drawn between the PFP and an expanded NATO.
Rubinstein argues that the PFP was created and implemented as the best way to
spread democracy and provide the alliance with greater opportunities in a variety
of fields. He writes:
The PFP was also touted...as the best way to keep the United 
States bound to Europe, to give NATO responsibility to engage in 
out-of-area operations, to spread democracy to the former Soviet
satellites, to block neo-isolationist’ efforts to reduce US
2
expenditures on NATO, and to contain Russia.
 ̂Alvin Z. Rubinstein, “America's Stake in Russia Today,” Orbis 41 {Winter 
1997): 31-38.
 ̂ Ibid.. 35.
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Although the PFP was not primarily or deliberately aimed at Russia, Rubinstein 
contends that it gave the Russians that impression. Instead of ushering in peace 
to Europe, the PFP has “repolarized Europe and had chilling effects on Russian- 
American relations.” The chilling of relations is due primarily to the 
misconceptions surrounding the purpose of the PFP. To date the purpose of the 
PFP is still a mystery; Eastern and Central European countries viewed the PFP 
as a waiting room for NATO membership. It is Rubinstein's belief that an 
expansion of NATO would have the same or greater effect on US-Russian 
relations as the PFP had.
Rubinstein further contends that any eastward expansion of the alliance can 
only be viewed by the Russian military and political leaders as a threat. In a 
recent book, Russian Foreign Policv: From Empire to Nation-State. Rubinstein 
and co-author Nicolai N. Petro, argue that from a Russian perspective, NATO
4
enlargement represents the main threat to regional equilibrium. The Russian 
government views Central and Eastern Europe as a demilitarized, buffer zone 
separating Europe and Russia. The Russian government views any effort by 
NATO to expand into this area as an attempt to re militarize the region, and 
direct these countries’ armed forces toward Russia. That is, the Russian
 ̂ Ibid.
4 Nicolai N. Petro and Alvin Z Rubinstein, Russian Foreign Policv: From 
Empire to Nation-State (New York: Longman, 1997), 152.
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government views the re-militarization as an attempt to move NATO’s eastern 
border closer to Russia.
Despite pressures within his own government to do otherwise, by mid 1995, 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin recognized — with reservations — the inevitability 
of NATO’s expansion. Yeltsin’s first reservation was that NATO’s expansion 
should be gradual and in consultation with Russia. Accordingly, there have been 
high level meetings between the US, NATO officials, and Russia regarding the 
possibility of expanding the alliance.
The second reservation was that there should be strict rules governing the 
admission process. Through this reservation, the Russian government was 
trying to limit the flight of potential allies to the West and maintain its buffer zone. 
with Western Europe. Should expansion go ahead without their involvement, the 
Russians were afraid of losing their safety net of Eastern Europe. The final 
reservation was that, eventually, Russia be allowed to join the alliance.
However, the admission of Russia would create an interesting dilemma. By 
admitting Russia, NATO’s area of operation could possibly extend all the way 
into Asia and the Pacific. It is unlikely that the European allies in NATO would be 
willing to become involved in Russia’s problems in Asia.
In addition to the three reservations put forward by Yeltsin, Petro and 
Rubinstein contend that the Russian government opposes NATO expansion for 
a number of other reasons. According to them, NATO expansion would first, 
“delay Russia’s integration into Europe and create security subsystems which
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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exclude Russia.” The Russian government is interested in trying to establish a
new pan-European security arrangement in which they can be founding
members. From the Russian’s perspective, the NATO alliance is a relic of the
Cold-War, and should only be kept around until a suitable replacement is found.
Second, expansion of the alliance would erode Russian trust in the West, further
isolating Russia and strengthening anti-Western political circles with Russia. For
the maintenance of a lasting peace in Europe, Russia needs to play a substantial
role, and therefore can not be alienated from Europe.
Third, expansion will “increase the tendency within Russia to develop an
6
alternative security system, accentuating the division of Europe.” The 
consequences of such an alternative system could be another Cold War, as both- 
Russia and the United States begin to gather up their allies. Resulting in a 
situation where each side is moving forward with its own plans for European 
security. Fourth, expanding NATO before a new security mechanism is in place 
would limit Russia’s ability to participate in the international arena. The Russian 
government believes that if they are unable to participate as founding members 
in a pan-European security arrangement then their participation in the 
international arena as a whole will be limited. As NATO expansion is unlikely to 
include them initially, the Russians are fearful that they will not be able to 
influence events in Europe. Finally, expanding NATO would make the Baltic
® Ibid.
® Ibid., 153.
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States and Ukraine permanent sources of discord with the West. The problem 
here is that where the Baltic States and Ukraine finally end up — either in 
Russia’s sphere or NATO’s sphere -  will be a permanent source of contention 
between Russia and the West.
According to Rubinstein, the concerns expressed by the Russian government
should be enough to prompt the Clinton administration to rethink the logic of the
PFP, and therefore the logic of an expanded NATO. On the subject of the PFP’s
relevance to western security, Rubinstein writes;
[The PFP is] devoid of any strategic logic, military necessity, or 
ideological merit. Strategically, the PFP answers no threat. There 
is no power vacuum in Europe that NATO has to fill. NATO is 
unchallenged on the continent. Russia is weak, disorganized, and
intent on finding a way out of its internal time of troubles.
In response to the argument that the expansion of NATO will bring stability to 
Eastern and Central Europe, Rubinstein contends that the remedy for their
anxieties is “work, not welfare. ”̂  The author is of the opinion that these countries 
should establish free-trade zones, joint enterprises, and mini-customs unions to 
encourage cooperation among neighbors. Additionally these countries should 
work together to attract foreign investment in order to tackle their shared 
problems (energy, industrial, economic, and ecological). The logic behind the 
cooperation approach is that if the nations of Central and Eastern Europe learn
 ̂Alvin Z. Rubinstein, “America’s Stake in Russia Today, ” 35. 
® Ibid.
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to live with each other, then there would be no need to expand the alliance into 
that area.
In his article, “America’s Stake in Russia Today, Rubinstein also addresses 
the concern among Western leaders that Russia is still capable of launching an 
invasion of Europe. Rubinstein contends that the threat of a conventional attack, 
should not even be a concern among Western leaders. According to the author 
the Russian army is “underfunded, poorly led, riddled with corruption, and 
desperately in need of the kind of extensive restructuring and professionalization
undertaken by the US Army in the decade after the pullout from Vietnam.”  ̂ The 
author’s belief is that conventionally, the Russian military is incapable of 
attacking westward. The failure of the Russian military in Chechnya illustrates . 
the lack of preparedness on the part of military. The military’s inability to mount 
even a small-scale invasion makes it highly unlikely that an attack could be 
launched on a larger scale against Western Europe.
Despite the lack of ability on the part of Russia’s conventional forces to 
intimidate the West, the Russian government is still in charge of a vast strategic 
arsenal. The best way to deal with the threat of Russia’s nuclear weapons is 
through continued arms control negotiations. The recent negotiations in Helsinki 
in 1997 have produced the START II treaty and laid the groundwork for a START 
III treaty. The START II treaty is designed to reduce the nuclear arsenals on 
both sides to about 3,500 warheads and missiles, the minimum to which both
 ̂ Ibid., 36.
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sides are willing to drop. Should there arise a desire to reduce nuclear 
weapons further, the negotiations would have to involve the other nuclear 
powers. One observer of these problems, Michael Mandelbaum from the Johns 
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, in an article published in 
Newsweek, believes that the ill will between Russia and the United States is
“blocking ratification by the Russian Parliament of START II." °
Pushing ahead with expansion plans could prove detrimental to US-Russian
relations in the future. Additionally, moving ahead with expansion of NATO could
also lead to the alienation of Russia. Mandelbaum writes:
Most dangerously, bitterness over NATO expansion could turn
Russia, over the long term, against the entire post-cold-war
settlement. That settlement, including the liberation of Eastern
Europe, the end of the Soviet Union and the dramatic reductions in
11
military force, is extraordinarily favorable to the West.
The thought of alienating Russia through expansion of NATO is particularly
disconcerting, especially if it could perhaps lead to another Cold War.
Mandelbaum views expansion of NATO as the first step in changing “the security
12
arrangements of Europe taken against Russia’s wishes.” As one of the largest 
owners of nuclear weapons, relations with Russia need to be given special 
attention. Perhaps, based on these arguments, expansion of the alliance is too
Michael Mandelbaum, “Don’t Expand NATO, ” Newsweek (December 23, 
1996): 33.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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risky to go ahead with. Whatever the decision, the various authors discussed 
above contend that Russia needs to be made a full partner in the negotiations.
Economic drain on the West
Unstable Economies 
The process of converting the eastern command economies into western 
style market economies has proved difficult, and will play an important role in 
deciding who will be admitted into an expanded NATO. According to a scholar in 
the field of Eastern European studies, Michael Roskin, the countries of Eastern 
and Central Europe began programs of privatization and marketization in an 
effort to "Westernize " their economies. Marketization, according to Roskin, is the 
process by which a country frees prices, allowing them to “find their own level
13
with few or no fixed prices or government subsidies.” Roskin defines 
privatization as “turning previously socially or state-owned industries over to
14
private owners." The attempts by Central and East European governments to 
“Westernize" their economies have had serious consequences.
Early in the 1990s these economies began a downward plunge, marked by 
rising inflation and the closure of numerous industries. During these tough 
economic times, most governments experienced a rise in the number of votes
Michael G. Roskin, The Rebirth of East Europe. (Upper Saddle River, New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1997), 164.
Ibid.
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cast for Communist parties. The increase in support for the Communist parties 
prompted new fears of economic collapse leading to a return to the old Soviet 
style system. The votes cast for the communist parties were a symbol of the 
people's displeasure with the governments’ failure to reform and “Westernize” 
the economies. Some economies, such as those in the Balkans, continued to 
slide; others, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary managed to 
turn around. However, in spite of the turn-around experienced by some of these 
countries, their economies are still not healthy.
Despite the turn-around experienced by some of these countries, all of their 
standards of living pale in comparison to the West. Roskin asserts that the 
standards of living are roughly twenty-five percent of that of their western
counterparts.^^ For stability to be maintained in these countries, and thus allow 
them to provide a meaningful contribution to NATO, the economic systems must 
be stabilized. Until that transformation takes place, these countries would be 
providing a sub-standard contribution to the alliance. That is not to say that the 
new members would be shrinking from their duties; rather, the new members 
may not have the economic support base necessary to provide a quality 
contribution to the alliance.
Ibid., 165.
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Lack of High Technology 
In addition to the problems associated with Central and Eastern European 
economies, problems are also present in the field of technology. According to 
Howard Frost, a Washington-based international security affairs analyst, a 
number of technical problems surround NATO’s proposed expansion, including
problems of “standardization of force structure, weapons, and communication
16
equipment." The cost to modernize the militaries of Eastern and Central 
Europe, thus bringing them up to the level of the West, could be phenomenal. 
The modernization cost alone should be enough to make the West reconsider 
the proposed expansion eastward. Instead of admitting these countries 
immediately, western leaders should consider waiting until the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe have been able to modernize both their economies 
and their militaries.
Problem of consensus 
Is Bigger Better?
Scholars in the field of European security often draw parallels between an 
enlarged NATO and the EU and the UN. They cite both the UN and the EU as 
examples of organizations that are too-large to reach decisions effectively. The
Howard E. Frost, "Eastern Europe's Search for Security," Orbis 37 (Winter 
1993); 39.
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greater the number of members, the more difficult it becomes to reach a 
decision.
In the case of Eastern and Central Europe, the countries of the region have 
significantly different views on social, political, and economic issues. Two 
observers in the enlargement debate maintain that, through enlargement, the 
alliance would face the so-called “numbers problem.” The “numbers problem” 
states that; “irrespective of the merits of the candidacies of individual countries, 
NATO could end up enlarging to the point where it became another overlarge,
toothless Organization for Security and Cooperation in E urope.Increas ing  the 
membership of the alliance without regard for this problem could lead the 
alliance into a situation in which its strength, and subsequently its effectiveness, . 
are severely diluted.
Howard Frost contends that the decision making capability of the alliance 
could become significantly hampered by increased membership. He writes that 
NATO could “find its decision making encumbered with the addition of a group of 
members having significantly different political, military, and force-planning
tra d itio n s .C u rre n tly , no acceptable solution has been offered to remedy the 
“numbers problem" or the problems associated with eastern force-planning 
issues, which continue to plague expansion planning. Therefore, how NATO
Ronald D. Asmus and F. Stephen Larrabee, “NATO and the Have-Nots: 
Reassurance After Enlargement,” Foreign Affairs 75 (November/December
1996): 14.
Howard E. Frost, "Eastern Europe's Search for Security," 39.
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addresses the problem of consensus will significantly influence the 
effectiveness of the alliance in the future.
Problem of exclusion
Dealing with the countries that do not make the cut 
To date, the question about NATO’s expansion has focused almost 
exclusively on the countries that should be offered membership. Equally 
important however is the question of how NATO deals with the countries that are 
left out of the first round of expansion. The West’s handling of the “have-nots ” 
will have important consequences for the future of European security.
Ronald Asmus and F. Stephen Larrabee, two senior analysts at the RAND 
institute, argue that how NATO handles the "have-nots ’ will directly affect the 
stability of Europe. According to the authors, if these countries feel “shut out, a 
destabilizing backlash could materialize, undercutting support for reform and
19
Strengthening nationalist forces within these countries ” The authors contend 
that if NATO is to achieve its post-Cold War goals of security and stability in 
Europe, then the alliance must create a clear policy toward the have-nots. The 
creation of a policy toward the have-nots will help to ensure that a destabilizing 
backlash in Central and Eastern Europe does not occur.
Ronald D. Asmus and F. Stephen Larrabee, “NATO and the Have-Nots; 
Reassurance After Enlargement, ” 13.
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It is the authors’ view that the alliance is split three ways regarding how far 
expansion should go and how to get there. According to Asmus and Larrabee, 
the first group wants “an open door policy based on self-differentiation: 
countries’ aspirations and their ability to meet the standards the alliance sets for 
new members would determine enlargement’s extent and pace Essentially 
the open door policy implies that the alliance must not impose its preferences in 
enlargement. Additionally the alliance should endeavor to refrain from including 
some, while excluding others. In theory then, NATO membership is open to all 
members of the PFP; it is up to would-be members to establish the parameters 
for their ascension to the alliance. The authors view the open door policy as the
official policy of the Clinton administration, which does not want "the benefits of .
21
security integration and cooperation limited to a handful of countries. ”
The authors term the second approach to the enlargement dilemma as 
“parallel expansion ’ The parallel expansion approach holds that the list of 
NATO candidates should “be the same as the list of current and potential
members of the European Union. ” The logic behind the parallel approach is 
that if the list of possible NATO members is the same as a list for the EU, Russia 
would have greater difficulty in opposing the expansion. Membership in NATO 
would be seen as a logical extension of membership in the EU. The parallel
Ibid.
Ibid., 14. 
Ibid.
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approach is only designed to integrate the nations of “Europe,” thus excluding 
Ukraine and Russia. The parallel approach runs the risk of alienating both 
Ukraine and Russia, who feel that their security is intertwined with that of 
Europe.
The final view holds that NATO’s enlargement should be limited to a few 
countries, based on strategic criteria and then cap the process. Proponents of 
the capping approach argue that this is the best way to appease the Russians 
and keep the alliance from overburdening itself with new commitments. The 
problem here is that by capping the membership process, even more countries 
would become alienated from the West. These countries could likely form 
alliances of their own, returning Europe to an alliance system similar to that of 
the Cold War.
The countries of Eastern Europe have a number of fears regarding the 
expansion process. Many of the countries that are unlikely to make the first 
round of NATO expansion are also unlikely to make the first round of EU 
expansion, a serious blow to the county’s morale. Additionally, these countries 
are afraid that the PFP initiative will be weakened as the more active members 
are given membership in NATO. According to Asmus and Larrabee, the risk is 
that “if NATO does not extend its security umbrella to all of Eastern Europe and 
the Baltic States, the destructive nationalism and geopolitical maneuvering that
23
made the region so unstable In the past could be rekindled." Regardless of
“  Ibid., 17.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
who is admitted in the first round, the alliance needs to take careful steps to 
ensure that the process of marketization and democratization continues in the 
countries that are not admitted in the first round.
In an effort to remedy the problem, the authors propose that a compromise
be struck between the proponents of self-differentiation (the first approach) and
those who support parallelism (the second approach). According to the authors,
the two elements could,
...create a narrow band of common ground on which a consensus 
on enlargement could be built: an open door’ proclamation 
affirming that the first new NATO members will not be the last, 
without naming next-round candidates; and a recognition of the 
self-differentiation that has already taken place among NATO
aspirants not included In the first round.
They further assert that a compromise between the first and second approaches 
leaves the alliance with a number of options. By adopting the compromise 
approach the alliance could then recognize countries that have stated their 
intentions to seek membership, and have achieved progress in meeting the initial 
criteria and goals through participation in the PFP. These countries would then 
be placed in a special category, essentially a holding pattern, awaiting the 
eventual offer of membership. In addition to the aforementioned compromise, 
the authors advocate that NATO reorganize the PFP in an effort to expand 
cooperation and defense integration among those countries that are not admitted 
in the first round. The move to reorganize the PFP could alleviate fears by the
Ibid., 16.
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Central and East Europeans that the PFP will weaken once the most active 
members are admitted into NATO.
The proposal that Asmus and Larrabee suggest is that NATO create 
“strategic homes” around the borders of alliance members. Essentially, these 
“homes” would consist of sub-alliances, with specifically tailored political and 
military establishments ~ all of which would be under the auspices of NATO 
command. The envisioned system calls for the creation of three sub-commands, 
one each in the northeast, southeast, and east-central Europe. These new 
commands would be responsible for “security in the region as a whole, not only
at NATO’s borders.
These regional commands would allow potential NATO members to cement . 
their ties with allies at the regional level, while allowing them to play a key role in 
security in their region. The compromise strategy would help to manage Russian 
concerns about the alliance’s expansion, as well as leave the door open for 
Ukrainian and Russian admittance to the alliance. The use of these sub­
commands could also play a role in alleviating the problems associated with 
numbers. The sub-commands could act as representatives at NATO meetings 
for the countries in its command, a representative system.
Ibid., 19.
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION
Review
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact 
have left NATO confronting the post-Cold War world, and subsequently 
searching for a new role. The original role of the alliance was to prevent the 
expansion of the Soviet Union into Western Europe. However, the breakup of 
the Soviet Union has made the role of "defender of the West” obsolete. 
Whatever role emerges will likely involve a redefinition of the identity of the 
alliance as it confronts an expanded membership from former Warsaw Pact 
countries. However, expansion of the alliance does not necessarily address the 
issue of the alliance's new role. Through expansion, the alliance would simply 
be growing larger, without addressing the problem of what its exact security 
mission should be — a reformulated “selective security” organization or an agent 
of the UN’s “collective security "
The previous two chapters have sought to explain the major arguments 
surrounding the expansion of NATO. These chapters have provided an analysis 
of the primary arguments — both for and against — that various scholars and 
world leaders have made regarding the expansion of the alliance. While 
expansion of the alliance may be a foregone conclusion, one must also 
understand the potential problems that expansion could present to the alliance.
84
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Arguments Supporting Expansion
Chapter three examined some of the benefits that an expanded NATO could 
provide to Europe. These benefits include the following possibilities; creating 
four new missions for NATO, helping to ease tensions between Russia and 
Eastern Europe, and providing the basis for a broader security framework. The 
new missions for the alliance include 1) acting as an agent of regional stability,
2) improving burden sharing and continuing the process of de-nationalization of 
defense policies, 3) providing a force for unity in Europe, and 4) possibly 
becoming involved in out-of-area actions.
Acting as an agent of regional stability the alliance could alleviate the fear of 
a security vacuum in Eastern Europe. As Howard Frost noted, the concept of a . 
security vacuum is intended to refer to “the region’s lack of international 
structure, uncertain democracies, weak economies, ethnic strife, and potentially
troublesome neighbors.’’  ̂ In response to the perceived security vacuum, many 
Eastern and Central European countries have begun to find other avenues with 
which to ensure their security rather than wait for the West to accept them. This 
trend could act to increase regional tensions. However, by expanding the 
alliance eastward. Central and East European countries would have no reason to 
look beyond NATO for security guarantees. Jeffrey Simon contends that the 
future of European security will be directly affected by “the relationships now
 ̂ Howard E. Frost, "Eastern Europe's Search for Security," Orbis 37 (Winter 
1993): 37
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forming among states that arose from the old USSR, and it is particularly
affected by the degree to which those relationships are cooperative or
2
competitive.” Even more than many Western European states, Central and 
Eastern European states see NATO as the fundamental European security 
institution capable of providing stability in the region.
The second mission of an expanded NATO involves burden sharing and the 
continued de-nationalization of defense policies. According to Simon, de­
nationalization of defense policies has been one of NATO’s greatest 
achievements and has contributed to building confidence and stability among 
European nations. Simon argues that if NATO were to “atrophy and wither 
away, re-nationalization of defense planning might occur and old suspicions
3
might resurface.” A key factor related to the de-nationalization of defense . 
policies is defense burden sharing among members within the alliance. The 
former secretary general of NATO, Manfred Worner, contends that as NATO’s 
forces are restructured and scaled down, the burden of European defense needs 
to be shouldered equally by all members, both current and new ones Worner 
emphasizes that as force reductions take place, there needs to be “an equitable 
shouldering of the roles, risks, and responsibilities of our common defense, 
which will require “the continued presence of Canadian and US forces in
 ̂Jeffrey Simon, "Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO." Orbis 37 (Winter 
1993): 23.
 ̂ Ibid., 24.
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Europe.” Through burden sharing, the alliance could better maintain a sense 
of equality among members
Through expansion, the alliance could also become a useful force for unity in 
Europe. Because some countries are not members of the European 
Community, the alliance plays an important role as an institution that anchors 
those states both to Europe and to a credible security arrangement. If NATO is 
allowed to disintegrate slowly, the repercussions could be very serious. Simon 
claims that should NATO wither away, “insecurity and identity crisis would likely
be the result, first on Europe's flanks and then throughout all of Europe.”  ̂
Additionally, as Eastern Europe is brought into the fold, some countries that are 
invited to become members of NATO may elect to remain outside of the 
European Community. In the unlikely event this were to take place, NATO could 
play an important role in keeping non-EC member states attached to a pan- 
European organization. In short, to maintain a strong European security 
organization — and thus a strong and peaceful European community -  the 
connection between non-European EC members, Canada, and the United 
States must be continued.
Involvement in out-of-area actions represents the final mission in which an 
expanded NATO could have a role. Typically, NATO's “area” has been
^ David Bender and Bruno Leone, Eastern Europe: Opposing Viewpoints 
(San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press Inc., 1990), 255.
 ̂Jeffrey Simon, "Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO," 24.
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associated with Europe. However, former President Richard Nixon, sees 
European defense as NATO s core mission, but views participation in out-of­
area actions as its “cutting edge.” The globalization of national interests has 
made it necessary to consider Western security concerns in the context of the 
entire planet, and to think of security concerns in terms of neighbors, trading 
partners, and sources of strategic raw materials. Thus, maintaining interests 
abroad calls for an organization that is capable of out-of-area operations.
Further participation includes assistance with peacekeeping missions (IFOR) and 
the maintenance of forward-deployed material for other operations. Though the 
alliance itself may not participate directly in out-of-area actions, Simon contends 
that “the alliance will likely provide the necessary back-ground conditions for
7
implementing such actions."
According to Robert E. Hunter, the Soviet Union will “remain the premier 
security concern in Europe -  the leading threat...to stability and predictability on
the Continent."^ Therefore, NATO could provide an important safety net for 
Eastern and Central Europe with respect to Russia. The Russian government’s 
support for ethnic Russians living outside of Russia has prompted new fears of 
Russian imperialism, especially in light of the deployment of troops to the
 ̂David Bender and Bruno Leone, Europe: Current Controversies (San 
Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press Inc., 1992), 247.
 ̂Jeffrey Simon, "Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO," 25.
 ̂Robert E. Hunter, “The Future of European Security, “The Washington 
Quarterly 13 (Autumn 1990): 60.
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republic of Chechnya in 1994. The relationship between Eastern Europe and 
Russia is similar to that of Russia and its former republics. The countries of 
Eastern Europe are fearful of a resurgent Russia intent on reviving its former 
superpower status at the expense of its neighbors. Expansion of NATO to 
include these countries would calm fears and stabilize relations. Additionally, by 
encouraging the Eastern European countries to adopt Western norms and 
behaviors, these countries could become more productive and responsible, thus 
contributing to a more secure and stable Europe.
Through the expansion of the alliance the possibility exists that a broader 
European security organization could be created. Malcolm Chalmers advocates 
that Europe should attempt to create the European Security Organization (ESC).. 
The organization would incorporate all of the current members of NATO as well 
as the former members of the Warsaw Pact. Chalmers contends that the 
establishment of the ESO would “symbolize and seal the unity of the continent” 
in a number of different ways, and ensure a “secure and prosperous future for
9
Europe as the bipolar division of the continent comes to an end.” According to 
Chalmers the potential benefits to Europe for the creation of such an 
organization are numerous and great. Chalmers contends that the ESO would 
institutionalize common security, and thus help prevent a new division of Europe
into two or three opposing blocs. ° In short, the ESO would help to accelerate
 ̂Malcolm Chalmers, “Beyond the Alliance System: The Case for a European 
Security Organization,” World Policv Journal 7 (Spring 1990): 225, 247.
Ibid., 248.
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the process of European integration which is at least as crucial to a lasting 
peace as the security structures that are created.
Arguments Against Expansion
Chapter four examined the major problems associated with an expanded 
NATO. These problems included the possibility of antagonizing Russia, the 
possibility of expansion creating an economic drain on the West, the problem of 
establishing and maintaining a consensus within the alliance, and the problems 
associated with the have-nots.
In examining the possibility of antagonizing Russia, Alvin Z. Rubinstein draws 
important parallels between the PFP and an expanded NATO. He argues that 
the PFP was created and implemented as the best way to spread democracy 
and provide the alliance with greater opportunities in a variety of fields.
However, instead of ushering in peace to Europe, the PFP has “repolarized
Europe and had chilling effects on Russian-American relations." It is 
Rubinstein’s belief that an expansion of NATO would have the same or an even 
greater effect on US-Russian relations, being viewed by the Russian military and 
political leaders as a threat to their security. Essentially, the Russian 
government views the expansion of NATO as an attempt to move NATO’s 
eastern border closer to Russia.
Alvin Z Rubinstein, “America’s Stake in Russia Today,” Orbjs 41 (Winter
1997): 35.
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In addition to the aforementioned problem. Petro and Rubinstein contend 
that the Russian government opposes NATO expansion for the following 
reasons. According to them, NATO expansion would first, “delay Russia’s
integration into Europe and create security subsystems which exclude Russia.’’^̂  
Second, expansion of the alliance would erode Russian trust in the West, further 
isolating Russia and strengthening anti-Western political circles within Russia. 
Additionally, expansion would “increase the tendency within Russia to develop
an alternative security system, accentuating the division of E u r o p e F o u r t h ,  
expanding NATO before a new security mechanism is in place would limit 
Russia’s ability to participate in the international arena. Finally, expanding NATO 
would make the Baltic States and the Ukraine permanent sources of discord with- 
the West.
According to Rubinstein, the concerns expressed by the Russian government 
should be enough to prompt the Clinton administration to rethink the logic of the 
PFP, and therefore the logic of an expanded NATO. Rubinstein also contends 
that the remedy for Central and Eastern European anxieties is work, not welfare. 
The author is of the opinion that these countries should cooperate together in 
order to tackle their shared problems. The logic behind the cooperation 
approach is that if the nations of Central and Eastern Europe learn to live and
Nicolai N. Petro and Alvin Z Rubinstein, Russian Foreign Policy: Froni 
Empire to Nation-State (New York: L o n g m a n , 1997), 152.
Ibid., 153.
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cooperate with each other, then there would be no need to expand the alliance 
into the area.
Additionally, Rubinstein refutes the claim by Western leaders and scholars 
that Russia is still capable of launching an invasion of Europe, claiming that the 
threat of a conventional attack should not even be a concern. The author’s belief 
is that, conventionally, the Russian military is incapable of attacking westward. 
The failure of the Russian military in Chechnya illustrates the lack of 
preparedness on the part of military. The military’s inability to mount even a 
small-scale invasion makes it highly unlikely that an attack could be launched on 
a larger scale against Western Europe.
Another observer, Michael Mandelbaum argues that pushing ahead with 
expansion plans could prove detrimental to US-Russian relations in the future, 
possibly leading to the alienation of Russia. Mandelbaum contends that 
bitterness over NATO expansion could turn Russia against the entire post-cold-
14
war settlement, which is extraordinarily favorable to the West. The thought of 
alienating Russia through expansion of NATO is particularly disconcerting, 
leading perhaps to another Cold War. Mandelbaum views expansion of NATO 
as the first step in changing “the security arrangements of Europe taken against
Russia’s wishes.’’^̂  Perhaps, based on these arguments, expansion of the
Michael Mandelbaum, “Don’t Expand NATO, ” Newsweek (December 23, 
1996): 33.
Ibid.
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alliance is too risky to go ahead with. Whatever the decision, the various 
authors contend, Russia needs to be made a full partner in the negotiations.
The instability of Eastern and Central European economies is another area of 
considerable concern in the expansion debate. According to Michael Roskin, the 
countries of Eastern and Central Europe began programs of privatization and 
marketization in an effort to “Westernize” their economies, however, these 
programs have had serious consequences. Early in the 1990s these economies 
began a downward plunge, madted by rising inflation and the closure of 
numerous industries. During these tough economic times, most governments 
experienced a rise in the number of votes cast for Communist parties — a symbol 
of the people’s displeasure with the reforms -  prompting fears of economic 
collapse leading to a return to the old Soviet style system. Some economies, 
such as those in the Balkans continued to slide; others, such.as Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary managed to turn around. Despite the turn-around, 
all of their standards of living pale in comparison to the West. Roskin asserts 
that the standards of living are roughly twenty-five percent of that of their western
counterparts.^” For stability to be maintained in these countries, so that they 
could provide a meaningful contribution to NATO, the economic systems must 
be stabilized.
Michael G. Roskin, The Rebirth of East Europe (Upper Saddle River, New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1997), 165.
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In addition to the problems associated with the Central and Eastern 
European economies, problems are also present in the field of technology. 
According to Howard Frost a number of technical problems surround NATO’s 
proposed expansion, including problems of “standardization of force structure.
weapons, and communication equipment. "̂  ̂ The cost to modernize the 
militaries of Eastern and Central Europe could be phenomenal. The 
modernization cost alone should be enough to make the West reconsider the 
proposed expansion eastward. Instead of admitting these countries immediately, 
western leaders should consider waiting until the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe have been able to modernize both their economies and their 
militaries.
Another problem related to an expanded NATO is that of reaching a 
consensus within a larger organization. Scholars in the field of European 
security often draw parallels between an enlarged NATO and the EU and the 
UN. They cite both as examples of organizations that are too-large to reach 
decisions effectively. Two observers in the enlargement debate maintain that 
through enlargement, the alliance would face the so-called numbers problem, 
which states that: “ ...irrespective of the merits of the candidacies of individual 
countries, NATO could end up enlarging to the point where it became another
17 Howard E Frost, "Eastern Europe's Search for Security," 39.
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overlarge, toothless Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Another commentator, Howard Frost contends that the decision making 
capability of the alliance could become significantly hampered by increased 
membership. Frost writes that NATO could “find its decision making 
encumbered with the addition of a group of members having significantly
different political, military, and force-planning traditions."’  ̂ Currently, no 
acceptable solution has been offered to remedy the “numbers problem” or the 
problems associated with eastern force-planning issues, which continue to 
plague expansion planning. Increasing the membership of the alliance without 
regard for these problems could lead the alliance into a situation in which its 
strength, and subsequently its effectiveness, are severely diluted. Therefore, 
how NATO addresses the problem of consensus will significantly influence the 
effectiveness of the alliance in the future.
The final problem relating to the expansion of the alliance relates to the 
countries that are left out of the first round of expansion. According to Ronald 
Asm us and F. Stephen Larrabee, the West’s handling of the “have-nots” will 
have important consequences for the future of European security. According to 
the authors, if the have-nots feel “shut out, a destabilizing backlash could 
materialize, undercutting support for reform and strengthening nationalist forces
Ronald D. Asmus and F. Stephen Larrabee, “NATO and the Have-Nots. 
Reassurance After Enlargement,” Foreion Affairs 75 (November/December 
1996): 14.
Howard E. Frost, "Eastern Europe’s Search for Security," 39.
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within these countries.”^° The authors contend that if NATO is to achieve its 
post-Cold War goals of security and stability in Europe, then the alliance must 
create a clear policy toward the have-nots. The creation of a policy toward the 
have-nots will help to ensure that a destabilizing backlash in Central and Eastern 
Europe does not occur.
In an effort to remedy the problem of the have-nots, the authors propose that 
a compromise be struck between the proponents of self-differentiation (the first 
approach to expansion) and those who support parallelism (the second approach 
to expansion). The authors assert that a compromise between the first and 
second approaches leaves the alliance with a number of options. By adopting 
the compromise approach the alliance could then recognize countries that have . 
stated their intentions to seek membership, and have achieved progress in 
meeting the initial criteria and goals through participation in the PFP. These 
countries would then be placed in a special category, essentially a holding 
pattern, awaiting the eventual offer of membership.
In addition to the aforementioned compromise, the authors advocate that 
NATO reorganize the PFP in an effort to expand cooperation and defense 
integration among those countries that are not admitted in the first round. The 
move to reorganize the PFP could also alleviate fears by the Central and East 
Europeans that the PFP will weaken once the most active members are admitted
Ronald D. Asmus and F. Stephen Larrabee, “NATO and the Have-Nots. 
Reassurance After Enlargement,” 13.
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into NATO. The proposal that the authors advocate is me creation of “strategic 
homes” around the borders of alliance members.
Essentially, these “homes" would consist of sub-alliances, with specifically 
tailored political and military establishments, which would be under the auspices 
of NATO command. The envisioned system calls for the creation of three sub­
commands, one each in the northeast, southeast, and east-central Europe.
According to the authors, these new commands would be responsible for
21
“security in the region as a whole, not only at NATO’s borders.” These regional 
commands would allow potential NATO members to cement their ties with allies 
at the regional level, while allowing them to play a key role in security in their 
region. The compromise strategy would help to manage Russian concerns 
about the alliance’s expansion, as well as leave the door open for Ukrainian and 
Russian admittance to the alliance. The use of these sub-commands could also 
play a role in alleviating the problems associated with numbers. The sub­
commands could act as representatives at NATO meetings for the countries in 
its command and serve as a “representative system.”
Where the Alliance Currently Stands 
Following a summit meeting in January 1996, in Brussels, the NATO alliance 
expressed an interest in expanding to other democratic states within Europe. 
Reports from the summit indicated that expansion would take into account the
97
Ibid., 19.
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political and security developments in the whole of Europe. After the summit
was concluded, an internal study was begun by the alliance’s foreign ministers to
analyze how the alliance should expand. According to Gebhardt von Moltke,
NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, the study addresses a
number of key issues relating to the enlargement process. Moltke writes:
It [the study] addresses, on a basis of consensus, a number of key 
aspects of enlargement: the cooperative and undivided Europe 
which NATO Allies want to see come about; the contribution of an 
enlarged Alliance and of other international organizations such as 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the 
European Union, and the Western European Union, to such a 
Europe; and the place and role of Russia in a cooperative
European security architecture.
The study also outlined the need for careful handling of the expansion process 
and the guidelines that new members are expected to adhere to prior to being 
admitted. The first tentative steps toward expansion were taken later that same 
year.
In December 1996, the alliance announced that it was formally considering 
the admittance of new members. According to an article published in the New 
York Times, no reference was made concerning which countries would be invited 
to join, only that the alliance expects the new members to “join the alliance by
Gebhart von Moltke, "NATO moves toward enlargement, ” NATO Review 44 
(January 1996): 3-4.
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1999.” The front-runners for expansion are Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic, but other possibilities include Romania and Slovenia.
A final decision regarding which countries will be allowed to join the alliance is 
expected to be reached at the July 1997, NATO summit in Madrid. In a 
statement issued by the British Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, “ invitations 
will be issued at that summit [Madrid, 1997] to a number of countries -  at this 
stage no decision has been reached as to exactly whom — to begin the
24
enlargement of NATO.’ “ Until the announcement is made at the July summit 
little more than speculation can be made surrounding the expansion of the 
alliance.
The arguments that focused on the advantages of expanding the alliance into 
Eastern and Central Europe are persuasive. However, one must also consider 
the consequences that expansion will bring. Whatever the outcome may be, it is 
important that NATO’s foreign ministers have weighed all of the consequences of 
expanding the alliance into Central and Eastern Europe. One can only wait until 
an announcement is made, and the reaction of Russia and the have-nots is
Steven Lee Myers, “NATO takes steps to expand ranks into East Europe, ” 
New York Times (Wednesday, December 11, 1996); A1.
“NATO enlargement,” Survev of Current Affairs 26 (December 1996): 475.
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gauged, before passing ultimate judgment on the alliance’s decision to expand 
its membership.
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